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RESOLUTION TOUST CORPORATION ^ WHISTIEBLOWERS
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Resolutioo Trust Coporation Mhistle
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON
BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED THIRD CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
WASTE, FRAUD, ABUSE, MISMANAGEMENT, MISCONDUCT, HARASSMENT, AND DISCRIME^ATION AT THE RESOLUTION TRUST CORPORATION
SEPTEMBER 23, 1993
Printed for the use of the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
^4y
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S. Hrg. 103-^35
RESOLUTION TRUST CORPORATION WHISTLEBLOWERS
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON
BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED THIRD CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
WASTE, FRAUD, ABUSE, MISMANAGEMENT, MISCONDUCT, HARASSMENT, AND DISCRIMINATION AT THE RESOLUTION TRUST CORPORATION
SEPTEMBER 23, 1993
Printed for the use of the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 76-818 CC WASHINGTON : 1994
For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402 ISBN 0-16-043945-0
COMMITTEE ON BAhfKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS
DONALD W. RIEGLE, JR., Michigan, Chairman
ALFONSE M. D'AMATO, New York PHIL GRAMM. Texas CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri CONNIE MACK, Florida LAUCH FAIRCLOTH, North CaiDhna ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah WILLIAM V. ROTH, JR., Delaware PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico
PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut JIM SASSER, Tennessee RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts RICHARD H. BRYAN, Nevada BARBARA BOXER, California BEN NIGHTHORSE CAMPBELL, Colorado CAROL MOSELEY-BRAUN, Dlinois PATTY MURRAY, Washington
Steven B. Harris, Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Howard A. MenelL, Republican Staff Director
Patrick J. Lawler, Chief Economist
Patrick A. Mulloy, Senior Counsel / International Affairs Adviser
DouGU\s Nappi, Republican Counsel
Edward M. Malan, Editor
01)
CONTENTS
THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 23, 1993
Page
Opening statement of Chairman Riegle 1
Opening statements, comments, or prepared statements of:
Senator Kerry 2
Senator Bond 6
Senator Campbell 7
Senator Sasser 8
Senator Metzenbaum 9
Senator Murray 13
Senator D'Amato 82
WITNESSES
Patricia Schroeder, Representative in the Congress of the United States,
from the First District of the State of Colorado 11
Prepared statement 82
Michael J. Koszola, Resolution Trust Corporation, IG Agent, Chicago, IL 15
Prepared statement 83
Thomas O'Bryon, Resolution Trust Corporation, Costa Mesa, CA [former em- ployee] 19
Prepared statement 99
James Romer, Resolution Trust Corporation, Contracting Officer, Dallas, TX
[former employee] 24
Prepared statement 101
Debbie Sherrill, Resolution Trust Corporation, Claims Settlement Agent, At- lanta, GA 28
Prepared statement 121
William A. Henderson, Resolution Trust Corporation, Legal Information Tech- nician, Atlanta, GA 33
Prepared statement 123
Deanna Smith, Resolution Trust Corporation, Legal Division, Administrative
Assistant, Atlanta, GA [former employee, currently with FI)IC] 36
Prepared statement 124
Annette LePique, Resolution Trust Corporation, Section Chief, Affordable
Housing Unit, Newport Beach, CA 37
Prepared statement 125
Sandra Crisman, Resolution Trust Corporation, Department Head, Contracts
Department, Newport Beach, CA 40
Prepared statement 127
Hans Mangelsdorf, Resolution Trust Corporation, Asset Specialist, Newport
Beach, CA 42
Prepared statement 130
Thomas Bumside, Resolution Trust Corporation, Senior Attorney, RTC PLS
Program, Dallas, TX [former employee]^ 51
Prepared statement 131
Supplement to statement 441
Bruce J. Pederson, Resolution Trust Corporation, Attorney, formerly in RTC
PLS Program, Denver, CO 64
(III)
IV
Page
Jacqueline P. Taylor, Resolution Trust Corporation, Attorney, RTC PLS Pro- gram, Denver, CO 68
Prepared statement 179
John Waechter, Resolution Trust Corporation, Computer Services Specialist,
Denver, CO 75
Prepared statement 195
Additional Material Supplied for the Record
National Treasury Eniployees Union 215
Letter to Janet Reno, U.S. Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice 216
Letter to Stanley G. Tate, nominee, CEO, RTC 218
Letter to RTC Inspector General John J. Adair and FDIC Inspector General
Robert D. Hoffman from Senator Riegle dated November 19, 1992 228
Office of Inspector General, John J. Adair, Inspector General, response to
allegations regarding the OIG 230
Letter from The Deputy Secretary of the Treasury, Roger C. Altman to
Senator Riegle, dated September 28, 1993 311
Letter from Assistant Director — Investigations, Diane M. Mendoza 314
Stanford Law & Policy Review, magazine article entitled "A Never Ending
Story," by G. Christian Hill 448
RESOLUTION TRUST CORPORATION WHISTLEBLOWERS
THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 23, 1993
U.S. Senate, Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The committee met at 10:05 a.m., in room 538 of the Dirksen Senate Oflfice Building, Senator Donald W. Riegle, Jr. (chairman of the committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN DONALD W. RIEGLE, JR.
The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
Let me welcome all those in attendance this morning.
As luck would have it, we are going to have a vote shortly.
I want to start and make an opening statement, and invite my colleagues to do so as well. I know Senator Kerry is on his way. We have our distinguished House colleague, Representative Schroe- der here, who also may be facing a vote on the House side, but we very much want to get her statement and testimony today.
So let me begin now, and we will go as long as we can. When we have to adjourn for a vote, we will do that very rapidly. And I would hope, Congresswoman Schroeder, if you do not get caught with a House vote, that you will be able to stay so that we can go right on into your testimony.
This morning the committee is going to hear allegations of waste, fraud, and mismanagement at the Resolution Trust Corporation. These issues have been brought to our attention over the past year not only from today's witnesses — and I thank them all for coming — but from a number of Senators both on and off the committee, as well as a number of members of the public at large.
Concerns about the RTC are not in any way partisan concerns. They have been raised in hearings before this committee for the past several years by Republicans and Democrats alike.
Most recently, during the course of the committee's consideration of the RTC funding bill back in March, Senators John Kerry, Bryan, Boxer, Campbell, Moseley-Braun, Murray, and Metzenbaum among others, highlighted them at that time.
In their additional views and statements on the Floor, these Sen- ators and others on both sides of the aisle stressed the need to im- prove the management at the RTC. Thev indicated that reform of RTC management was a condition for their supporting additional funding.
Among the many issues they focused on was the need to ensure proper financial management and direct accountability at the RTC.
(1)
Another overriding priority they highlighted was the need to re- form and reinforce the RTC's contracting controls.
Other weaknesses they pointed to included the RTC's inadequate asset recovery, marketing, and information systems, the impor- tance of an effective, independent inspector general, the need to provide real opportunities for minorities and women to participate fully, professional liability issues, and finally whistleblower protec- tion.
The Banking Committee in turn incorporated all of these protec- tions in the Thrift Depositor Protection Act of 1993. I know from conversations with the Clinton administration that it is absolutely committed to making these improvements.
In hearings before the committee, Senators D'Amato, Domenici, and Bond have repeatedly stressed their concerns, as have virtually every other Member of the committee, with certain RTC manage- ment problems.
Shortly we will be considering the nomination of Stanley Tate to be the new Chief Executive Officer of the Resolution Trust Cor- poration. It is vitally important — and I underscore that — that he be made directly and lully aware of the many areas for improvement that we have identified.
I want to particularly acknowledge my colleague. Senator John Kerry from Massachusetts, for his really outstanding work in help- ing put together this morning's hearing. He and his staff, and the staff of the committee, have worked closely together.
That has been much appreciated by me. I think the importance of today's hearing, as the facts roll out, will illustrate that point.
I also want to commend all of our witnesses for their willingness to testify today. It takes courage for people to step forward, as they are doing today, to tell the things that need to be heard that they know about, and the committee greatly appreciates their coming forward.
The witnesses here today are people who worked at five of RTC's regional offices, including Atlanta, Chicago, Dallas, Denver, and Newport Beach, California. They include employees from RTC's Legal Division, from Asset Management, and from Administrative Services of various kinds.
In addition, we will receive testimony from one individual from the RTC's Inspector General's Office who has made some disturb- ing allegations concerning that office's effectiveness.
We are especially pleased to be joined this morning by our very distinguished House Colleague, Congresswoman Pat Schroeder. I want to particularly welcome her, and I will have more to say when we call on her.
Let me now turn to other Members for opening statements. Let me start, if I may, with you. Senator Kerry, for your important role in this, and then I will go to Senator Bond.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN F. KERRY
Senator Kerry, Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I am particularly grateful to you for holding this hearing, and for your interest and support in the effort to try to examine the RTC. You have held many, many hearings on the RTC, and you have tried diligently to provide the oversight that is necessary, and I am
very, very appreciative to you for your commitment to do that, and for being willing to do it today. I would like to share some thoughts about why I think this is important, and not just sort of another kind of hearing.
We are, all of us, increasingly reminded by the public of the enor- mous gap between what we come here to do and what we are per- ceived as accomplishing. This is not a problem that can be taken lightly. It really cannot. It is the heart of what this Country is all about. As you watch the Soviet Union, the former Soviet Union, going through upheaval, as you watch other countries struggling with this notion called "Democracy," it is rather interesting to watch here at home how we treat it ourselves.
I know you, Mr. Chairman, and all of us have come here with a particular set of ideals and a particular set of beliefs about what we want to accomplish. At the center of that I think is really our notion that we are here holding the public trust responsible for how our citizens' dollars are spent.
Increasingly we are finding that our citizens are angry about that: angry about a Grovernment that seems to act as if it is be- holden only unto itself, or to the people who are temporarily in these seats that we hold.
I think that all of us need to be a heck of a lot more sensitive to our responsibilities in delivering to people. I want to particu- larly, therefore, single out and thank those who have chosen to come forward and testify today.
We have all served in institutions. I spent 4 years in the military and I spent 6 years in the Prosecutor's Office. We all know the turf tensions. We all understand how pressures in the work place are brought to bear, and each institution creates its own culture, you know.
Do not upset the apple cart. Do not go out and say that. Well, gosh, you are going to hurt people here within the institution. You are going to jeopardize your job. Why make life miserable for peo- ple? It is a lot easier just to go along and get along.
That culture begins to destroy the heart of the public trust that we have all been given. Ultimately it begins to destroy people's faith in the process itself, which destroys our ability to make deci- sions, because there is no legitimate consensus in this country for what we are trying to do because there is no credibility.
So I think this is not just an isolated kind of event. This is my personal observation of it. If we cannot prove to people that we are somehow holding the system accountable, that we care about how those dollars are spent, that we can establish an ethic that is big- ger than just that sort of internal culture of the institution, but rather a larger ethic about the larger ideals around which our Grov- ernment was founded and who we are responsible to, I do not take it lightly and I do not think any of my colleagues take it lightly, but I want to make it very clear that those of you who come here today who are called "whistleblowers," which is in itself a terrible term
I think you are "Patriots" in the best sense of the word. You are people who want to hold the system accountable. You are citizens who pay your taxes who are outraged by practices that you have been made a party to, and are somehow expected to condone, that
are contrary to the very best sense of what all of us ought to be delivering.
You are public servants who do not believe that "public service" entitles you to rip off the public. I think that deserves to be ap- plauded, not discouraged, and it definitely deserves to be protected.
There is no other way we are going to hold the system account- able, if the people within the system do not feel that accountability. So I say that this committee has a special sense of responsibility to guarantee that when you go back to that workplace you are not victimized, that you are indeed protected, and that we go forward from here understanding our own obligations.
Now, why are we here today?
We have all heard from the GAO that, gee, there are some prob- lems down at the RTC. We hear people say there is waste and fraud and abuse, but these are words that have become so common- place they almost do not have meaning now.
I am not sure that there is an agency in Grovernment where we do not hear about waste, fraud and abuse. It is a cliche, but it does not have meaning until you begin to g^ve life to the incidents and practices which constitute that waste, fraud and abuse.
Now I reluctantly voted for additional money to continue to fund the RTC, recognizing that there were big problems down there, and all of us at the time expressed our sense that the Treasury really did not have an adequate picture of those problems.
I thought I did. Candidly, until many of the folks who have come here today to testify, and indeed until many of those who are not even here today because they fear to testify — just to make people clear on the gap between those who corroborate what is going to be said here today versus those who had the courage to come for- ward, there is a gap — there were many who told us things but who said I cannot put myself in that position, or I fear for retribution to my company, and so they are not here today.
But the RTC has failed to operate according to the law that was established by the U.S. Congress. They were supposed to maximize recovery on assets, and GAO has concluded that they have not — for a lot of the reasons I just articulated.
We required the RTC to minimize its negative impact on local markets as they sell off properties. In fact, we have heard from one experienced RTC real estate manager in California that there is substantial reason to believe, or at least it is a question whether the RTC has not really contributed significantly to a certain drop in real estate prices as a result of forced sales.
We required the RTC to make efficient use of funds. We found enormous failures there. We have actually learned how some RTC managers leave funds sitting in interest-free accounts, literally costing the Taxpayers thousands of dollars, for no reason at all.
We required the RTC to minimize losses in resolving cases by going after wrongdoers, and we found that it disrupted its own ability to do that through a reorganization that resulted in demor- alization of staff and loss of some of those cases.
Early this year, we asked our staff of this committee to go out and really try to talk directly to RTC employees to determine whether the kinds of problems that were identified by the GAO were indeed being cleared up. Did we understand those problems
thoroughly? I wanted to determine whether there were ongoing management problems in addition to the obvious difficulties that the RTC was having.
Well, we found, to our dismay, that literally dozens of managers and employees from RTC across the country were candidly confessing to our office that the GAO's reports of disarray literally only scratched the surface; that the reality is worse. As one re- cently departed official from the RTC in Washington told my staff, it is not only a catastrophe, but it is a snakepit.
We were told of case after case of waste, fraud, and mismanage- ment, many cases involving people at senior levels. We heard alle- gations of steering contracts from RTC personnel to former or fu- ture employees.
We heard of major accounting firms receiving enormous contracts ill-equipped to do it, and then going out and hiring inexperienced people to do what they had promised to do, and doing incompetent work, and padding their bills, to boot.
We were told of RTC managers telling lower level employees to pay bills, regardless of the quality of the work, even when that work was being questioned and when there was sufficient cause to question the quality of the work.
We were told about faulty computer systems for legal billings with thousands of lost invoices so that the RTC could not even de- termine if a bill was legitimate or not.
We were told repeatedly about cases of sexual discrimination, and even sexual harassment at the RTC and in the workplace.
Now I cannot vouch for every allegation, but I can tell you when this many people are willing to come forward who currently work somewhere and take an oath and testify under oath, and as many people corroborate that testimony who cannot come forward be- cause of the fear that they expressed, there is, as the old saying goes, fire where there is smoke.
I think it is, at the very least, important to have a full-fledged administrative internal investigation of these, or even some of them, through the Justice Department. There have been disturbing suggestions that the Inspector General's office itself has not func- tioned as it should have, and we will hear some of that today.
I would just like to take a couple of minutes, Mr. Chairman, to relay to my colleagues some of those things that people who would not come here today, but who have testified to us privately, were willing to say. There was one real estate auction specialist at the RTC who said, and I quote him:
RTC's auction sales are costing the Taxpayers 15 percent or more in relation to the real value of the real estate. The data is massaged to hide the losses through appraisal mechanisms that narrow the difference between the real value and what the RTC actually sells it for. And my office in California
Quoting him:
— has probably wasted $500 million of its own and Taxpayers' money due to this process.
Second, the statement of an RTC real estate manager:
Managers at RTC have consistently yelled and cursed at staff, physically and sex- ually abused staff, targeted women and minorities for abuse, attempted to force staff to break RTC rules and regulations, attempted to force the award of contracts to their friends, attempted to force others to cover up their actions.
A statement of a senior PLS investigator with extensive experi- ence in Government:
I have worked for the Government all my life. Is the RTC worse? Yes. It is the worst I ever saw. This is not the real Government. They don't have any rules. They do their own thing. Places I come from, people are very tight with a aoUar. At the RTC, there's no attempt to save the Taxpayer any money. The organization defies any command structure. People aren't held accountable for their actions, and they aren't getting their job done. I've never been in an oi^anization that, when someone brings a problem to management's attention, instead of fixing the problem they try to get rid of the person who brou^t the problem to their attention.
Finally, the statement of a bankruptcy RTC lawyer who left the RTC employ earlier this year to go to the FDIC, He said:
When I was at the RTC, it was the blind leading the blind leading the blind. We had a receptionist who wound up becoming the person who qualified our attorneys for RTC contracts. She knew nothing about the law, and the lawyers we hired viewed us as nothing but deep pockets. We would pay a lawyer $46,000 for a collec- tion action that could be done for $2,500 to $4,500 in the private sector, for work that did not need to be done, and which was done incorrectly. Then we'd hire the lawyer again. I used to say that the RTC was a theater of the absurd.
Now there are good people at the RTC, and the great difficulty in this kind of effort is always distinguishing between rampant practice and good people who are trying to make things work.
I also appreciate that it is difficult for this committee, or any committee in this instance, to sort out every allegation and every statement. We cannot determine every part of what is fact, and this is not a jury, and this is not a court of law, but we are respon- sible ultimately for how these dollars are spent.
One of the great roles of the U.S. Congress — not sufficiently pur- sued I think today — is oversi^t. We tend to come to the crisis. We tend to respond to it, and then we all go away as if it has all taken care of itself More often than not, it is not, and it has not been.
So we are here today, and agEiin I thank you, Mr, Chairman, to fulfill that role of oversight and to raise important questions, to probe, and to try to set the stage somehow for some effort to try to guarantee to the citizens of Uiis country that we are not fools, that we are not willing to just waste their dollars, that there is a process in place, and that some people care enough to try to hold it accountable.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Kerry.
Senator Bond.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CHRISTOPHER S. BOND
Senator Bond. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for calling the hearing today. Obviously there is much to be discussed. I want to express my appreciation to our friend, Representative Schroeder, for taking the time to appear before the committee today, and I hope. Congress woman, that you will have an opportunity to provide your testimony.
I have to apologize in advance that I am going to have to leave because my Appropriations Subcommittee has a markup starting right after the vote, but I assure all of you I plan to review the tes- timony and the record.
The hearing today is intended to hear testimony from a number of witnesses concerning allegations of employment discrimination, complaints of sexual and racial discrimination, and significant
other complaints concerning waste and abuse at the Resolution Trust Corporation.
While I do not yet have the full information, I am not in a posi- tion, nor do I intend to stand in judgment, on any of these com- plaints. I do believe very strongly this committee has an obligation and a duty to provide appropriate leadership and oversight regard- ing the actions and policies of agencies over which we nave juris- diction.
I emphasize that we expect all agencies of the Federal Govern- ment to comply with all the laws and other applicable require- ments, including those relating to the conduct of their employees. Where an agency or an employee of that agencv fails to comply with the law or a legal requirement, we demand that the agency take whatever steps are necessary to ensure that the situation or the circumstance is remedied.
I want to stress that I have another concern about the hearing.
We have generally before us testimony of 13 witnesses, some former employees of the RTC, and some current employees of the RTC. Each has a complaint. As I understand it, some of the com- plaints have been addressed, and some are pending. The RTC has assured me that it takes all complaints seriously, and that it at- tempts to find equitable solutions, and that it does remedy cir- cumstances or situations where warranted.
The problem I have, Mr. Chairman, is that neither the RTC top management nor the RTC's Inspector General are present today to testify. I do not know whether they have been invited to testify, but I do believe that for us to have a full and fair hearing on these is- sues we do need the testimony of the RTC and the RTC's Inspector General.
With respect to these and other allegations and complaints that have been made, again, Mr. Chairman, I think this is a veiy vitally important oversight hearing. I look forward to reviewing tne testi- mony and the record, and I commend you for holding the hearing.
The Chairman. We have every intention of following up on what we hear today. That is the whole purpose, really, of laying it out, so that we can go down this trail and get to the end of it.
Senator Campbell.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BEN NIGHTHORSE
CAMPBELL
Senator Campbell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I certainly appre- ciate your efforts and Senator Kerry's efforts for this hearing.
I wanted to welcome my friend and colleague from the great State of Colorado, Pat Schroeder, who has been a terrific warrior, on many battlefields, whether it is for people that are abused in the RTC or the U.S. Navy.
I would point out to her that my dad's people, the Ancient War- riors, when they would vanquish their enemy they would often take their clothes. I was interested in your jacket.
[Laughter.]
Representative Schroeder. You noticed.
Senator Campbell. I noticed.
I, like several of my colleagues, had to vote very reluctantly for the $26.8 billion for the RTC this year. When I was on the House
8
side, I never voted for it once. I voted against it every time because I felt that their performance simply caused a lot of resentment and anger, not only among the constituents but also among the people in Congress, too, and I would not support it.
Former Senator Bentsen, now Secretary Bentsen, assured me be- fore I voted for it, as he did many of the Members of this commit- tee, that there was going to be a major overhaul and a lot of re- form, and I took his word for it.
I think he is still trying to do that, but certainly we have a long way to go. That is why I did vote for it. But we have ourselves a continued mess. The largest city in our State, Denver, recently mis- placed, if you can imagine this, $7 bilUon in real estate assets.
When they hired an outside firm to clean up the mess, they ended up getting taken by that company, as well. It just seems to me that RTC — the name commonly given to it in Colorado now does not stand for what it stands for, it stands for RIPOFF THE CONSUMER. We have the fifth worst asset recovery rate in the Nation, despite the fact that Colorado's real estate market has weathered the recession better than most States.
Just last week I received a letter firom a constituent telling me that the RTC had been bought into a limited partnership in a real estate deal. I asked him to comment on the legality of the deal.
But, legal or not, some people are pretty mad that the RTC is buying into real estate rather than liquidating the real estate.
Today the Denver office of course is no better off than it was be- fore. It is still in hot water for trying to harass RTC employees — and, by the way, some of them are here, and I applaud them for coming to testify.
Bruce Pederson, Jackie Taylor, and John Waechter are here be- fore this committee, and will be on a later panel. I certainly want to commend them for the courage that it took to bring the light of day to some things that should have been taken up a long time ago. I certainly give them my word as a Member of this committee that we are going to make every effort to protect the right that you have as Americans to be able to say what is wrong in Government.
I would also like to welcome Jim Romer, who is the brother of Governor Romer, the Governor of our State of Colorado, who is very active in public service, as his brother is, and look forward to these hearings.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Senator Sasser, the Chairman of the Budget Committee.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JIM SASSER
Senator Sasser. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
This morning, I want to welcome Representative Schroeder and our witnesses.
To those whistleblowers firom the Resolution Trust Corporation, I want to commend them for their courage and dedication in com- ing forward this morning and appearing before the committee and telling us their stories.
The RTC, as we all know, was set up to clean up the mess in the savings and loan industrv. We are discouraged and chagrined to learn that the waste, firaua, and abuse in the S&L industry now
appears to be making inroads into the Resolution Trust Corpora- tion that was conceived to clean up the mess.
So in this environment, Mr. Chairman, we in the Congress and in Government generally can have zero tolerance for mismanage- ment, for waste, and for abuse.
The Taxpayers are demanding that we get 100 cents worth of value out of every dollar spent. So I look forward to hearing from the witnesses today and getting some of these first-hand accounts. Perhaps from their testimony here this morning, we can design an action plan to put trust back into the Resolution Trust Corporation.
So I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank our witnesses for ap- pearing this morning.
The Chairman. We are joined also this morning by Senator Metzenbaum, who has had a keen interest in this subject and who has done a lot of work from his subcommittee position over on the Senate Judiciary Committee.
He has joined us before as a much-esteemed colleague. We are pleased to have you this morning, and would be pleased to hear any opening comments you would like to make, Senator Metzen- baum,
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR HOWARD M.
METZENBAUM
Senator Metzenbaum. Thank you very much, Senator Riegle.
I want to compliment you. Senator Riegle, and Senator Kerry as well. These are issues that have been before the Congress time and time again, and with no exception you have provided a leadership role. You have been supportive in your concern for protecting the Taxpayers' interest, and I think we all owe you an everlasting debt of gratitude.
Senator Kerry has certainly taken a very active role in exposing some of the problems that not only existed in yesterday, but that continue to exist at the RTC as we meet here today.
And of course Congresswoman Pat Schroeder is always in the forefront of every right issue in Congress, and we are so glad that she is over there and her voice is consistently being heard on issues of this kind.
I must admit, Mr. Chairman, that I do not have those same words of praise for the efforts and the actions of the administration to date.
I am a great supporter of the President of the United States, and have been a strong supporter, but I am not satisfied that those charged with the responsibility in the area of the RTC today, that their shoulder has been put to the wheel and has been as effective in protecting the public interest and being concerned about it. That particularly has to do with the issue of the statute of limitations and the retroactive aspects of it. They should have been with us and fighting on that issue, but instead they have been against it.
As you know, the Senate Conferees and the House Conferees will shortly meet with respect to the whole question of the budget and how much is going to be provided in order to bail out, to pay for some of the continuing problems in the savings and loan industry, as far as the RTC is concerned.
10
Now some of the most important testimony today will be about the serious failure of the RTC's Professional Liability Program which is supposed to sue malfeasant savings and loan officials.
The National Commission on Financial Institution Reform, a bi- partisan panel, reported this July that 10 to 15 percent of the costs of bailout are due to culpable misfeasance. That is $30 to $50 bil- lion.
Today's witnesses include three lawyers who used to work in the Professional Liability Section. They will tell us how the section was reduced to a shambles by a so-called "reorganization." Management be|jan to dismantle the unit just as the statute of limitations and suits against hundreds of savings and loan officials were about to expire.
Let me give you an example of the chaos that the reorganization caused.
Four RTC lawyers in the Baton Rouge RTC office were notified in 1992 that the office would be closed in 4 months; that the head of the office would be moved to Washington, and the other three lawyers would be let go. The supervising lawyer quickly moved to Washington. Two other lawyers took private jobs immediately. That left one lawyer in charge of the investigation of 92 failed thrifts. Even his secretary left immediately, leaving him to make do with temporary secretaries.
Of course the workload is impossible, and the RTC in Washing- ton had to know that. There were an estimated 30 or more poten- tial defendants to be investigated at each of the 92 thrifts, and hundreds, or perhaps thousands, of transaction loans and apprais- als to pursue at each saving^ and loan.
My staff asked the former RTC Baton Rouge lawyer what it was like to handle that workload alone for 4 months without even a permanent secretary while looking for another job. He answered by saying:
It was triage. We grabbed what was on fire at the time and put it out. We looked at the big transactions. We didn't look deeper. There wasn't enough time.
I want the American people to know that the 1992 reorganization of the RTC's Professional Liability Section made it impossible to in- vestigate hundreds, possibly thousands, of potential cases, and to recover millions of dollars. Instead of recovering that money, we are left to ask the Taxpayers to pay up.
I also want the American people to know that the former direc- tors and officers of failed savings and loans — and I think this is the most important part of my comment this morning — ^have friends in State houses around the country. Those State legislators have taken their side against the Taxpayers by passing bills to block suits by the RTC and FDIC to recover Taxpayers' money from neg- ligent savings and loan operators.
The most egregious legislation went into effect on the first day of this month in Texas. It was enacted without opposition on an emergency basis that allowed it to bypass public review.
A week ago. The National Law Journal had an excellent article on this wave of State legislation. I have provided each Member of the committee with a copy. I urge you to read it.
The Texas law says that a director or an officer of a failed thrift or bank may not be sued for negligence "by the Federal Deposit In-
11
surance Corporation, the Resolution Trust Corporation, or any other Federal banking regulatory agency" unless the director per- sonally profited from the transaction.
If Texas voters are not outraged by that, then the rest of the country should be. A grossly disproportionate number of all failed RTC thrifts and potentially liable thrift officials can be found in Texas.
Let me again read from the July report of the Bipartisan Na- tional Commission on Financial Institution Reform on the causes of the savings and loan disaster:
The system was most out of control in Texas, which became a breeding ground for imprudent and abusive practices. The savings and loans it chartered were al- lowed to engage in hig^-risk activities virtually without limit and supervision and examination were essentially nonexistent for several years. It was no accident that 40 percent of all Taxpayer losses came from Texas savings and loans.
It is outrageous that the Federal Government and the Federal Taxpayer is providing Federal insurance to cover losses caused by negligent savings and loan operators in States which have enacted laws to shield those operators.
Those laws make a mockery of Congress' intent to keep the RTC's cost to innocent Taxpayers to a minimum. They are shame- ful laws. They are a testimony to the complete route of the RTC's Professional Liability Program.
I am grateful for this chance to hear from the rank and file of the RTC. These are dedicated people. These are courageous peo- ple— to hear from them how difficult it has been for them to protect the Taxpayers and get the word out.
As we are about to go forward with a new RTC management, I hope this hearing serves as a beacon for change.
Thank you.
Senator Kerry. [Presiding.] Thank you very much. Senator Metzenbaum.
Let me just say that you have really been extraordinarily sup- portive and vigilant bn this, and we are very, very appreciative. This is about your thlird hearing. I think I have seen you here as a non-member of the committee, and I think it is a tribute to your efforts to create accountability.
Congresswoman, thank you for your patience. We have been a
little interrupted here. We have a vote on right now. The Chairman
is on his way to vote, as is Senator Sasser. They will be returning
forthwith. So if we could start your testimony, hopefully they will
/ be back and I will be able to get to vote without having to recess.
STATEMENT OF PATRICIA SCHROEDER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, FROM THE FIRST DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF COLORADO
Representative Schroeder. Thank you very much, Senator. I want to thank the whole committee for allowing me to be here and for focusing on this.
I am going to ask unanimous consent to place my statement in the record, because this is a hearing from the heroes of the day, from the people who have had the courage to come here and, in the bright lights, tell us what is wrong with the Resolution Trust Cor- poration.
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Everybody knows that there is something wrong. Everybody smells a rat. We could visit every single office in America and waste would jump out at you. You have to have people who have a lot of courage and who are willing to come forward to talk about it, or you are never going to find it.
Obviously the two people that I am very proud of are Bruce Pederson and Jackie Taylor who are from Colorado, who testified in front of this committee before. What their great "crime" is, ac- cording to the Resolution Trust Corporation, is that they raised some questions about the Professional Liability Section.
We all know that there were legitimate questions that should have been raised about that.
They have worked very closely with my office. They have cooper- ated with the General Accounting Office. They have cooperated with the Inspector General.
But let me tell you how they have been treated: Since they first raised the questions, instead of the questions being dealt with, they were dealt with — they were demoted; they were isolated in a sepa- rate building; they were threatened with transfers to Kansas City; and most recently, which I think is really egregious, RTC broke into Bruce Pederson's computer and copied all his files.
That jeopardizes communications with the House and Senate, or anybody else.
There is a very clear message that went out to every other em- ployee of the RTC in my region, and that is: Don't you dare blow the whistle on waste or fraud.
The big problem is, we still have not seen anything happen from this. I have asked the Department of Treasury to investigate the break-in, and in August they said that, oh, this was not retaliation. I do not know how they could say that. It does not pass the giggle test.
I am still waiting for the Inspector General's report. Maybe the Senate has more clout than we do, but we certainly have not been able to get the Inspector General's report, which is long overdue.
I have written the Justice Department and asked why in the world they are not concerned about this computer break-in. We have yet to hear from them, either. So maybe this committee hear- ing today with these very, very courageous people, can help do it.
I have worked to protect wnistleblowers from retaliation for a very long time. I do not know how we do oversight without people who can talk to us. Unfortunately, there is a mentality in the West about rumps together horns out. That often is how every agency wants to approach any inquiries or criticism. It is like: Out of our way! We will do what we want!
Therefore, whistleblowers end up isolated and unprotected. We are trying very hard now in the Congress on our side to pass whis- tleblower protection for employees in Federal corporations like the RTC. Unfortunately, every time you pass one whistleblower act, they find some new form of retaliation. So I just hope we can move along and get that done.
Like many of you, I was very interested in information that whis- tleblowers had told me. I have got a whole file of stuff. We would be happy to share it with you. These are documents about the con- tracts that were signed, about personnel decisions that were made,
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about fee bills, about people who are going to make the most money out of this — ^law firms, and how they hire former RTC em- ployees, or have friends that are on the inside.
I think the Taxpayers are really sick about this. If we are going to reinvent Government, we had first better clean up Grovemment. We had better be sure it is responsive, and put this incredible thing behind us.
I thank you for your sincere interest in this, for calling these hearings, and let me put the rest of my testimony in the record.
The witnesses who have been there and who have been through the pain are the heroes of this hearing, and they should be the ones who are heard from.
Senator Kerry. Congresswoman, thank you very much. Without objection, your full testimony has been placed in the record.
Thank you particularly for your supportive efforts and leadership on this issue. It is very helpful, obviously. I am glad you came and celebrated the appearances of those from Colorado, who indeed de- serve congratulations.
Thank you, very much.
Representative SCHHOEDER. Thank you.
Senator Kerry. What I will do is ask the Members, all of them, of the panel who are going to testify all together on one panel, to come forward and take your places.
While you do that, I will recess temporarily while I go over to vote. As soon as Senator Riegle reappears, he will reconvene and start the testimony.
We will stand in recess while you take your places.
[Recess.]
The Chairman. [Presiding.] The committee will come to order.
I thank everyone for their indulgence as we had to adjourn brief- ly for the vote on the Senate Floor.
Let me call on Senator Murray for any comments she may want to make before I swear in the witnesses and we begin with their testimony.
Senator Murray.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PATTY MURRAY
Senator Murray. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I apologize for being late. I was asked to preside this morning, and I just got out of the Chair.
I appreciate your holding this hearing, Mr. Chairman. I think ev- eryone knows how strongly I feel about reforming the RTC. As a new Member of this committee, I reluctantly voted for the funding of the RTC. I am not sure everyone knows how strongly I feel that the RTC should go out of business and we should move on as quickly as possible.
This mess should be straightened out, and we should move on. But until that time, the Resolution Trust Corporation must be an organization that we the Taxpayers of this Country can be proud of and trust.
I have heard many stories of whistleblowers at the RTC. I hap- pen to believe in underdogs and I believe that one person can make a difference. So you should know, up and down this long panel of
14
witnesses, that your public service is recognized by Congress, and I appreciate your coming today.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. Senator Murray. I know I should acknowledge the strong concerns you have expressed both in this committee previously and to me as Chairman when we were working on the legislation earlier this year, and about the need to move ahead with precisely this kind of inquiry. So we are doing that today. But I appreciate you for that leadership, along with Senator Kerry, that I have acknowledged earlier.
Let me now introduce our witnesses one by one. After I have in- troduced them, I am goin^ to ask them each then to make their presentation in the order m which I introduce them. Once I have introduced all of you, I am going to ask you all to stand together and take the oath, and I will do that at the end of these introduc- tions.
Our first witness is Mr. Michael Koszola, who is an Agent in the RTC Inspector General's Office in Chicago, IL.
Mr. Thomas O'Bryon, who was an asset manager for the RTC's Costa Mesa, CA, office. He is now self-employed and resides in Eagle, CO.
Mr. James Romer, who served as the Contracting Officer in the Dallas, TX, office of the RTC. He has since retired and now resides in Carrollton, TX. As has been noted earlier, Mr. Romer is also the brother of the Governor of Colorado, Buddy Romer.
Ms. Debbie Sherrill is the Claims Settlement Agent in the At- lanta, GA, office of the RTC. She is responsible for the reviewing of contracts to ensure that the requested job has actually been com- pleted.
Mr. William Henderson, who is an FDIC employee on assignment to the RTC and handles documentation on legal contracting for the Atlanta, GA, office of the RTC.
And, Ms. Deanna Smith, who served as an Administrative As- sistant in the Legal Division for the Atlanta, GA, office of the RTC, and is currently with FDIC's Atlanta office. She was responsible for detecting waste and fraud in RTC vouchers.
Then, Ms. Annette LePique, who is the Section Chief of the Af- fordable Housing Unit in the Newport Beach, CA, office of the RTC.
Ms. Sandra Crisman, who is also located in the Newport Beach office of the RTC. She is the Department head of the Contracts Di- vision.
Mr. Hans Mangelsdorf, who is the Senior Property Manager in the RTC's Newport Beach, CA, office. He was the first person hired by the RTC in California to handle its real estate asset disposition program.
Mr. Thomas Burnside, who was a senior attorney in the RTC's Professional Liability section, and was located in the Dallas office of the RTC. Mr. Burnside is now in private practice in St. Louis, MO.
Then, Mr. Bruce Pederson, who is from the RTC's Denver office. Mr. Pederson gave very important testimony to this committee pre- viously in August 1992, during the review of the RTC's reorganiza- tion. In June 1993, Mr. Pederson was recognized as one of four re- cipients of the Cavallo Prize for Moral Courage. This award is
15
given annually to whistleblowers in either the public or the private sector, and we very much welcome him back and look forward to his testimony.
Ms. Jackie Taylor, from the RTC's Denver, CO, office who also testified before this committee in Au^st 1992, again very impor- tantly, to discuss the RTC's reorganization. We appreciated that then, as we do today. She also was recognized as one of the four individuals who were granted the Cavallo Prize for Moral Courage. We welcome her back before the committee today and look forward to what she will have to say to us.
Finally, Mr. John Waechter is located in the Denver office of the RTC and was the Computer Services Specialist that was instructed to conduct a search of Bruce Pederson's office computer earlier this year.
This is a very impressive and compelling list of witnesses. You have heard other Members express already their appreciation of your coming forward and being here today.
Let me ask all of you to stand now, if I may, and I would like you, once you are standing, to raise your right hands. I would like each of you to respond in the affirmative at the end of this ques- tion: Do you swear that the testimony you are about to give is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so Help you, God?
[The witnesses answer affirmatively in unison.]
The Chairman. Very good. Thank you, and be seated.
Mr. Koszola, we are going to start with you. We welcome you, and we are going to make your full statement a part of the record. We would like to hear from you now.
TESTIMONY OF MICHAEL J. KOSZOLA, RESOLUTION TRUST CORPORATION, IG AGENT, CHICAGO, IL
Mr. Koszola. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Members
The Chairman. Let me just do this so we start our procedure. These mikes can move right around. I would like you to get the mike right in front of the person speaking. Just pull it. It will move. So you can be well heard. I want you to be heard in the back of the room.
You may proceed.
Mr. Koszola. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, and Members, my name is Michael J. Koszola. I am pleased to have the opportunity to testify before you today. I have been a Federal Enforcement Officer for nearly 10 years. I have worked as a Special Agent for the U.S. Customs Service for 5 years. Since December 1991, I have been employed as a Special Agent for the Office of Inspector General of the Resolution Trust Corporation.
When I first joined the IG's office of the RTC, I viewed it as an opportunity to help uncover waste of the Taxpayers' dollars. Unfor- timately, I found that the RTC/OIG is not doing its job.
In fact, the RTC/IG has spent more time covering up or commit- ting fraud than it ever spent investigating it. In today's testimony I will describe how the RTC/IG engaged in rewriting reports, mis- leading Congress, covering up misconduct, shredding incriminating documents, and grossly distorting agency investigative priorities.
16
I witnessed cases in which agents at the RTC/OIG were in- structed to rewrite reports to have them read a particular way that would be less likely to require further investigation.
Investigative reports were altered in order to avoid embarrassing or politically sensitive disclosures. I was personally told by Clark Blight, Assistant Inspector General for Investigations, that it was the function of the Headquarters RTC/OIG to revise reports to out- side agencies, including the GAO, the Senate, and House Congres- sional Committees, in order to make sure the reports were favor- able.
At that time, Blight was in the process of revising one such re- port to Congressman Gonzalez, Chairman of the House Banking Committee, to reflect a more favorable outcome.
Another time, top RTC/OIG officials were sent to the Denver Re- gional Office in order to assist other special agents in writing a re- port of investigation involving the Bush family.
The RTC/OIG attempted to mislead Congress in other ways, as well.
The Chairman. Let me just ask you at this point, before you go any further. Those are very important statements you have just made. Have you retained in your records copies of these initial doc- uments, or findings, or the work that you did that was then later changed, or not accepted in the form that you had prepared it? Do you still have those materials?
Mr. KoszOLA. Sir, some of those files — all of my files, I was basi- cally kicked out of the office, and I may have some information, but a lot of this I witnessed firsthand — all of it. I mean, I had that con- versation with Clark Blight last year.
The Chairman. All right. Well, we will go through that. I will also say to the rest of you that, in situations that may be similar to what he has just described, if you have documents or written materials that would illustrate and substantiate the points you are making, I want to make sure we ask for and get all that may be available. So why do you not continue.
Mr. KoszoLA. In fact, generation of make-work reports was a common practice in the RTC. I was personally assigned three cases that were previously closed to which new case numbers were as- signed, despite the fact that there was no new evidence to warrant reopening the investigations. I brought this to the attention of management and was told the RTC/OIG was trying to keep Con- gress happy in order to secure additional funding.
I found instances in which we at the IG's office were told not to tell the truth to the General Accounting Office. Indeed, I was spe- cifically instructed by my supervisors at the IG's office, Daniel Sherry and George Sullivan in 1992, not to provide information to the GAO concerning RTC employees who had criminal histories.
I was further instructed not to say anything about the thefts in the building. The IG did not want to open up a case on the thefts, and it did not want the GAO doing so, either.
I learned of the political manipulation of investigations. Manage- ment would send agents to look over the shoulders of other agents when they were reviewing S&L matters that might pertain to polit- ical figures.
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Before the Presidential election in 1992, the RTC/OIG was ac- tively seeking criminal or other negative information from special agents on the Clinton family.
At some time in February 1993, an anonymous male telephone caller stated that Patricia Patterson was buying RTC properties in Dallas as a straw purchaser for Albert Casey, the Chairman of the RTC. Ms. Patterson was allegedly Mr. Casey's girlfriend.
The caller said he was an employee of the RTC and had reported this information to the RTC/OIG in Dallas, TX. The caller stated that, to his knowledge, no investigation was initiated by the RTC/ OIG because no auditors or special agents reviewed records re- maining at the Property Sales Department. I sent my supervisor, Mr. George Sullivan, a memo regarding this information. To my knowledge, no investigation was ever initiated.
Another investigation I tried to initiate involved reports of overbilling and sleeping on the job by employees of another RTC contractor. Coopers & Lybrand. I saw Coopers & Lybrand account- ants hired by the RTC perform little or no work at exorbitant cost. I saw accountants sitting and reading nongovernment literature and being paid for it by the RTC. When I investigated this, I was told that their contract permitted them to sit there and read when there was no work to do. It was an obvious ripoff.
When I tried to do something about it, I was told by my super- visor, George Sullivan, not to bother with it. The RTC employee who approved the payments to Coopers & Lybrand is now em- ployed by them.
An incident which epitomized for me the blatant disregard for the law in the IG's office occurred on August 24, 1992. I was on detail in DC shortly after Grerald Jacobs, Greneral Counsel of the RTC, had resigned under a cloud of allegations concerning personal and official impropriety— despite the fact that an Inspector Gen- eral's report said that it found no information showing any impro- priety with respect to Jacobs' dealing with a failed Arizona S&L.
I was working at the IG headquarters in Roslyn, VA, when I overheard Lew Sherman, Deputy Inspector Greneral for Investiga- tions, and Clark Blight, the Assistant Inspector General for Inves- tigations, laughing and making jokes about how they had taken care of the Jacobs' case by shredding documents all weekend with the help of several other agents. They joked how they had needed a second shredder from another office to handle all the shredding. Shredding documents following the conclusion of an investigation is not unusual. However, the circumstances of this shredding oper- ation raises a number of questions.
What was the hurry? Why did it occur over a weekend? Why did it take an entire weekend for two Assistant IG's and three Special Agents with two shredders to carry out a routine shredding? The three Special Agents received letters of exemplary service for their expedient response and professionalism in conducting the Jacobs' investigation.
On April 19, 1993, I was placed on indefinite administrative leave pending investigation into allegations of which I still have not been officially informed.
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On April 5, 1993, 2 weeks before I was placed on administrative leave, I was ordered by my supervisor, George Sullivan, to dis- continue any contact with the Senate Banking Committee.
Since being placed on leave, I have received threatening phone calls. I alerted the police after each call, and was able to tape one of the calls which consists of nothing but the sound of a machine gun. On another call the caller stated something to the effect: We're going to get you.
For the past several months I have not been permitted to work at all by the RTC. The Taxpayers are still paying my salary. I am ordered to come to work each Wednesday morning, and then or- dered to go home as soon as I arrive.
I have worked for a number of Federal agencies but never have I seen an agency managed so poorly and with such profound con- sequences for waste, fraud, and abuse as the RTC.
The Chairman. That is a very powerful statement.
Let me ask you this. What is the length of time of your Govern- ment service from when you first started?
Mr. KoszoLA. Ten years. Over 10 years.
The Chairman. And what would your record be over that 10 years in terms of your conduct, your ratings, your performance gen- erally?
Mr. Koszola. Overall, very good.
The Chairman. And prior to joining the Government? Can you just give me a little sketch as to your background?
Mr. Koszola. I went to school and paid for my own tuition. I worked part-time/full-time at banking brokerage houses and insur- ance companies.
The Chairman. You have a personal record that essentially is without any blemish? Is that a fair statement?
Mr. Koszola. Unless you are talking to a corrupt law enforce- ment official or some other manager that I worked under.
The Chairman. No, but with respect to your conduct and the way your conduct has been assessed by others and just your record, you come in with a clean record, do you not?
Mr. Koszola. Yes.
The Chairman. I wanted to draw that out, because I think when a person, a citizen who also is a Government employee, sees the things and hears the things that you did, I think you nave an obli- gation to do exactly what you have done.
I think your obligation is to not — is, rather than looking the other way or, you know, just going along with practices that you saw that were improper, I think your direct obligation is to do ex- actly what you are doing today. That is, to come here under oath, tell us the truth as you understand it to be, and as others here will do today, and to put the bright light on practices that you've seen that you know and believe to be improper and incorrect.
So I want the record to clearly show that what you are doing here today is a very important public service, and it is appreciated by this committee.
I want to make sure that we take whatever steps we can to put an end to any harassment or intimidation in any way, shape, or form that is being directed at you. We have a Justice Department and an Attorney Greneral in which I have confidence who I think
19
would be very distressed to hear what you have said, and we in- tend to so inform her of what you have said in terms of some of these threatening activities that are going on at the present time, because that is not America. It should not be America.
Does anybody else want to make just a brief comment before I go to the next witness?
[No response.]
Next is Mr. Thomas O'Bryon, who as I said earlier was an Assets Manager for the RTC's Costa Mesa, CA, office.
Mr. O'Bryon, we would like to hear from you now.
TESTIMONY OF THOMAS O^RYON, RESOLUTION TRUST CORPORATION [FORMER EMPLOYEE], COSTA MESA, CA
Mr. O'Bryon. Good morning. Senators, and thank you for letting me be here today.
In the 1980's I worked with a lot of the S&L's in the Pacific Northwest trying to deal with a lot of the non-earning asset prob- lems, much in the same way that the RTC is trying to deal with the assets of failed institutions.
In 1990 when I heard that the RTC was opening an office in Costa Mesa, CA, I decided to apply, seeing as how this was my background.
Senator Kerry. [Presiding.] Do you want to give us just a little sense of that background?
Mr. O'Bryon. Basically what I would do would be to go into an institution that was having
Senator Kerry. What are you trained as, and how long have you worked at it?
Mr. O'Bryon. I am sorry, sir?
Senator Kerry. What are you trained as? And how long have you worked in that capacity?
Mr. O'Bryon. I have been in the real estate finance mortgage in- dustry since about 1976. That later translated into working as a consultant for savings and loans, actually all over the country, but specifically in the Pacific Northwest and in California.
I was involved in handling what are called REO Disposition Transactions, which is Real Estate Owned, foreclosed assets, and the like; and I have handled several billion dollars worth of assets during the 1980's for failed — or savings and loans that were in fi- nancial trouble and trying to save themselves before the RTC was formed.
I was offered a position in June 1990, with the Costa Mesa RTC office to come in and try to deal with the non-earning asset prob- lems, but I absolutely became fed up and disgusted after about a year. I left.
I decided that I could possibly work with individuals who were trying to buy assets fi-om the S&L's, because I certainly was not having any luck selling property for the RTC while I was there, as I had brought in offers of in excess of $50 million within the first month of my accepting the job at the RTC. Those properties were still on the books over a year later when I left the RTC.
The manapment of the RTC can only be described as "crisis management' from where I sit. During my tenure there and my subsequent dealings with the RTC, I experienced fits of rage, rude-
20
ness, yelling, sexual innuendo, and generally demeaning and harassing behaviors. This was done by senior staff as well as other staff.
Many people were threatened with firing, as was I, on more than one occasion. These are fear tactics. Fear tactics don't have any place in management, especially when you are trying to get a job done, and especially with one tnat has the magnitude of the RTC.
From time to time, the RTC in Washington or the Denver office would request reports of information having to do with real estate. I was the individual that those requests would come to. There have been many times those requests would take 2 weeks to get to me from Washington.
By the time the request got to me, many times that request was due the day before I received it. Many of these reports were going to take 4, 5, 6, 7 days to complete. I had one day to complete wiem. There was absolutely no way in the world that I could complete a report of the magnitude that I was asked for in one day. So, as a result, the report would go in incomplete.
I would refuse to put my name on it saying that this was 100 percent accurate. In fact, I would put statements on there saying that I felt that this information was 60 percent accurate, or 50 per- cent, or whatever it might be. I was told that if I did not remove those statements and sign it saying it was 100 percent complete, I would be fired. This was ridiculous. If I signed it and sent it up saying it was correct, I am going to get in trouble with Washington for sending in fraudulent information. If I do not put my name on it, I am going to get fired. This is an untenable situation. Not only was I in this situation, but I know that many of the people at this table were placed in that kind of a compromising position.
After about 3 or 4 months in the RTC, I was asked to be involved with the REGIS program, the acronym called REGIS stands for Real Estate Gwned Inventory System. This was a precursor to the system that is now in place called "REGMS," which is the Real Es- tate Gwned Management System.
The REGIS was a temporary system just to get by until REGMS could come on line. This system was flawed from the beginning. Too many people from too many areas of the RTC tried to be in- volved in the design and absolutely knew nothing about computer design and what a computer could or could not do.
As I was involved in the implementation and the setup of the RIG system on the West Coast, I was asked to come back to Wash- ington to help them put controls in place that would make the sys- tem more effective.
At the same time I came back here, I asked to maybe be a part of the team that was designing the REGM system. I was not con- sulted. I was not asked to be a part. In fact, I was told that anyone having to do with the RIG system would not be allowed to be in- volved with REGMS.
The REGM system, ladies and gentlemen, is going to cost the American Taxpayers in excess of $100 million. It never had to cost that much. It could have cost a fraction of that. But because they would not consult with people who really knew what they were doing, because management had their own agenda on how it was
21
going to be put together and what was going to be done with it, the American Taxpayer is really taking it in the shorts.
As to the inappropriate behavior, more than what I have just said, I am currently a witness in a Grovernment case that involves inappropriate behavior of a sexual nature, abuse of position by at- tempting to inappropriately influence subordinate-level employees, abuse of position by inappropriately accessing files, and abuse of position by attempting to harm other employees' careers.
I do not think it would be appropriate to discuss the details, but I am involved in a lot of the information that hopefully will keep some of the upper management out of the RTC since they have been dismissed.
As to the subject of waste and what Senator Kerry was saying earlier, the waste, to put it in as graphic terms as I can, I men- tioned the RIO system and the REOM system: $100 million for a single computer system that does not work.
When I was taken off of the RIO system because I kept bringing these issues to light, I was given a number of apartment buildings in Phoenix, AZ — 6, to be exact. The total value of these apartments were about $9 million. When I took these over and I started inves- tigating, I found $1.4 million sitting in checking accounts earning absolutely no interest for the Taxpayers. That money had been sit- ting there for over 9 months. Now that money could have — the in- terest that that money could have earned would have paid my sal- ary and a number of my colleagues' salaries.
I was constantly told that we did not have the budget to do what we needed to do. The reason we did not have the budget was be- cause management was not paying attention. Management was not doing what FIRREA, RTC's legislation, calls for us to do — which is, to keep all the moneys in interest-bearing accounts.
When I asked the manager who had been taking care of this why he did it, why he did not move the money to the Department of Ac- counting, he said that: Because if I have to write a case study, the paperwork is going to be ridiculous just to be able to fix a water pump or a pipeline or whatever it might be, and I don't want to have to deal with all that paperwork.
I have had two contacts with the IG's office where I have filed two complaints. One was the waste of the example I just gave you, that of money sitting in non-interest-bearing accounts. The other was, I have currently notified the IG that there is an individual currently working for the RTC who is illegally bujdng properties from the RTC using front men. I know of this because I was asked by one of the front men if I wanted to participate. They did not know that I used to be an RTC employee, and they did not know of my involvement in this hearing, nor in the case I am testifying in out in California next month.
To get into the real waste, however, let us talk about auctions and sales. While I was at the RTC, as I said, I brought in $53 mil- lion worth of offers on three different apartment buildings in the first month I was there. I was told that they were not assets that I was handling, and therefore it looked inappropriate for me to be trying to get these properties sold. What was my vested interest in doing this?
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I went to my boss and I said, lookit, my vested interest is, this is my job. This is what we are supposed to be doing. Thirteen months later, those properties were still on the books. I found out that just last month one of those properties finally went to sale, and it went to sale for $10 million less than the offer I had pre- sented back in 1990. That is waste, and that is a lot of money.
A lot of the assets that had good offers coming in on them would, from time to time, just subsequently be pulled to be put into an auction because somebody wanted a good looking, high profile piece of property in that action.
You would have a piece of property that had a good, solid con- tract of sale pending, and they would pull it; put it in the auction; the sale would take place at the auction for a substantially reduced jrice, and you would then be left with the loss that never should lave taken place. But this was a common occurrence. This again las cost the Taxpayers not millions, not tens of millions, not hun- dreds of millions, but billions of dollars.
One specific example of another piece of property that I
The Chairman. [Presiding.] Let me just stop you there for a minute and ask you, as you recite this, and as you try to figure out in your own mind, as you were doing at the time, how could things be so badly managed: How could so much money be wasted and squandered?
I would be interested in knowing, as you were thinking all this through, the degree to which you were deciding that it was just out and out incompetence. I mean, managers who did not know what they were doing, versus something beyond that, somebody who was deliberately in effect manipulating the process, or seeing to it that either things were steered a certain way, or in some fashion just, for whatever the purposes, making sure that things did not work right?
How would you divide it generally speaking between iust out and out incompetence, and somebody that was venal or had some other angle they were shooting here?
Mr. O'Bryon. I would have to say that probably 50 percent could be considered incompetence on the part of middle management; and the other 50 percent I would have to say was deliberate, people who said: We need a high-profile auction. We have got to make our- selves look good, because we looked so bad. We are in a fish bowl.
We want to put together an auction, and we want to sell hun- dreds of millions of dollars of properties, all high profile, good look- ing stuff so people can see we are doing our job.
Now I was told that specifically by the Washington sales office on one of my trips back here when I was dealing with the real es- tate inventory system. They came right out and said it. They made no bones about it. I said, yes, but it does not make sense to pull this property out, lose $10 million just for the sake of looking good, and they said "$10 million is nothing in the overall scheme of things."
Well, Senator, when I took over the REOI system in August 1990, there were 55,000 pieces of property within the RTC. There have subsequently been many tens of thousands more since then.
The Chairman. I am going to ask you to just stop at this point, because we are finishing a vote and we are on the second bells. But
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I also — I do not want you to say this until we get some of the other Members back in here. I want Senator Metzenbaum to hear this, who I think is en route back, and I want the others to hear this as well.
What you are saying is very important. We will take the time that it takes if we have to be here all day, or however long it takes. I want to go through this carefully and thoroughly.
So if I can ask your indulgence, I am going to put the committee into recess now briefly. When Senator Kerry and the others come back we can go ahead and resume, but I want to get the Members here as you go through this next part, which is very important.
The committee stands briefly in recess.
[Recess.]
Senator Kerry. [Presiding.] Mr. O'Bryon, you are still testifying?
Mr. O'Bryon. Yes, sir.
Senator Kerry. Go ahead.
Mr. O'Bryon. I was getting ready to explain to Senator Riegle that we had in 1990, when I took over the real estate owned inven- tory system at the RTC, 55,000 pieces of property listed in the in- ventory. Some of those were listed as "sold." Many of them were listed as "available," but the majority of them were listed in some sort of a "pending" status of litigation or problems, whether they be environmental, wetlands, and what have you.
I testified that in 6 apartment buildings, we found $1.4 million in cash not earning a penny's worth of interest. That is 6 out of 55,000.
I have another example of one R&D building, a research and de- velopment warehouse building in Colorado Springs, CO, that in 1991 sold at auction for $12.50 a square foot. Within one year, the purchaser syndicated that property for $50 a square foot. One year. He managed to make $4.5 million profit on one piece of property. So far we have talked about 7 pieces of property accounting for lit- erally millions and millions of dollars of Taxpayers money that has been wasted and lost.
If it was one or two pieces of property that this happened on a rare occasion, it would be one thing; but this is happening on hun- dreds and thousands of pieces of property accounting for billions of dollars of waste.
People who talk about the RTC costing the American Taxpayers $150-$ 170 billion? I defy them to go out and really do the honest accounting because, Senators, it is going to cost the American Tax- payers several hundreds of billions, if not trillions, of dollars.
Now it is easy to criticize, and it is much more difficult to produce workable solutions. I am here to not only talk about the problems, but I am also here to try and help with any of the solu- tions that I can.
Thank you for your time.
Senator KERRY. Thank you very much, Mr. O'Bryon.
Mr. Romer.
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TESTIMONY OF JAMES ROMER, RESOLUTION TRUST COR- PORATION, CONTRACTING OFFICER [FORMER EMPLOYEE], DALLAS, TX
Mr. RoMER. Mr. Chairman and Members of the committee, it is an honor and a privilege to address this committee regarding con- tracting irregularities, management improprieties, contractor collu- sion, and conflicts of interest at the Dallas office of the RTC during the early years of its existence.
The testimony I am about to give is based on first-hand knowl- edge and reflects my personal experiences while employed as a con- tract specialist in the Dallas Metroplex Consolidated Office of RTC.
Senator Kerry. What years were those?
Mr. RoMER. 1990, 1991, 1992, and 1993.
Senator Kerry. So you have just left there?
Mr. RoMER. Yes. I have just been dismissed.
Senator Kerry. You were dismissed?
Mr. RoMER. Yes.
Senator Kerry. What was the cause of your dismissal, if you know?
Mr. RoMER. Irregularities — Mistakes on the time sheet. I nor- mally go to work at 6 o'clock in the morning and work on Satur- days, and probably put in 45 hours a week, and sometimes I sign up for leave ahead of time to go to a meeting or something for an hour or two, and I am too busy that day and I might go the next day, so my time sheet was not accurate. So that was an excuse to let me go.
Senator KERRY, And this occurred after you had raised these questions publicly, or not?
Mr. RoMER. Oh, yes. I mean, yes, they had personally had the IG tail me for 14 months to find these "irregularities."
Just as one example, they, in the testimony I lefl my office — I normally go to lunch at 11 o'clock, after I go in at 6 a.m. I left the office at 10:28 a.m. and had an IG agent timing when my vehicle left, and I met two people at the Infomart down the street, which was a sting operation. They had invited me over and offered me a big contract to go overseas on an airplane because I had been a pilot for 50 years, and that's my interest, and I told them, no, I couldn't do that because they were offbase on what they were try- ing to ask me to do, and I was gone an hour and 18 minutes, and our lunch hour is only 45 minutes.
But I would estimate they spent $100,000 in 14 months to try to find enough reason for me to go.
Senator Kerry. OK Why do you not go ahead with your testi- mony.
Mr. RoMER. Prior to working for RTC, I had over 30 years' expe- rience in the area of
Senator Kerry. Pull the mike a little closer to you, Mr. Romer.
Mr. RoMER. Prior to working for the RTC, I had over 30 years' experience in the areas of real estate brokerage, appraisals, con- struction, business development, and computer applications.
Computer applications was business planning and applying com- puter technology, which today you call process re-engineering, is what I have been doing for 30 years.
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I have owned several businesses and have been directly super- vising up to 80 employees.
I began employment at RTC in February 1990, approximately 4 months after the Dallas office was opened. My first assignment at RTC was to organize and staff a contractor registration department for the Southwest Regional Office, which was also headquartered in Dallas.
I established an organization of six people, developed registration procedures, designed a computerized data base, and supervised the registration of the first 12,000 contractors in Texas.
My team also completed the solicitation and award of 75 con- tracts. As a result of this effort, I received the first gold star — the first Gold Star Achievement Award granted in the Southwest Re- gion.
However, all is not well in the co-located Dallas Metroplex Con- solidated Office, especially in the Contracting Department.
First, contracting was not and could not operate objectively since it was organizationally reporting directly to, and was fully respon- sible to, the Asset Management Department whose mission was to dispose of assets. The contracting managers were essentially told what to do and who to contract with. Contracting was little more than the conveyor's of paper that documented and validated deci- sions that Asset Management had already made.
For most of 1990 and 1991, the concept of fair and open competi- tion was a joke. This was especially true for minority contractors, since most asset managers were predisposed to conclude that mi- nority contractors were not capable of performing asset-related work.
Even though FIRREA had dictated the maximum-use criteria, senior management in Dallas would not permit contract registra- tion reports to reflect minority identification even though I had de- signed the data base to do so.
Second, the general hiring policy at the time was that anyone that had a FAR, a Federal Acquisition Regulation background, was not suitable for consideration to be hired in the Contracting De- partment. The reasoning was that, since RTC was not required to operate under FAR rules, it would be counterproductive to have people around with that kind of discipline.
People with FADA, the Federal Asset Disposition Agency, or banking backgrounds, the good buddies, many who were involved in creating the savings and loan crisis, were hired with abandon.
Third, the contracting operating environment clearly was driven by time pressures and deadlines dictated by Senior Asset man- agers. Contract specialists were fearful of losing their jobs if a con- tract, especially a SAMDA, was not awarded by the designated date set by Asset Management.
No matter if there were loopholes that permitted the contract to operate with little or no controls. I will recite the pillar incident.
My first insight into the buddy arrangement for awarding con- tracts came in October, 1990. During that month. Solicitation 761- 9966-90139-140, 141, 142, 143, and 144 were issued to secure con- tractors to perform computer corrections to the Assets at six loca- tions.
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I was the contract specialist assigned to work the sohcitation. One firm was the lowest bidder and the best qualified on all six of the solicitations. I performed the required verification and rec- ommended to the Asset Department that the contract be awarded to the low bidder.
Assets rejected the recommendation and requested that four of the contracts be awarded to the lowest bidder and two contracts be awarded to the second-ranked bidder whose chairman was friends with several of the senior staff of RTC.
In reviewing and checking the required certifications pursuant to FIRREA and 12 CFR 1606, there were obvious conflicts with the second-ranked bidder.
The Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the second-ranked firm was currently employed as a Senior Vice President of a sav- ings and loan and had not disclosed this employment as required by RTC Regulations.
During my inquiry into the information on the second-ranked firm's certifications, I physically went to the S&L loan office and obtained a letter from the personnel department confirming the employment of the Senior Vice President, and also obtained a copy of the institution's financial statement which listed the bidder^ chairman as Senior Vice President. These were obvious conflicts.
Finally, in response to my protests and refusal to award the two contracts to the second-ranked firm, I was given permission to award all six contracts to the lowest bidder as it should be. How- ever, the senior manager at the Dallas Metroplex Consolidated Of- fice had decided that the second-ranked firm would be awarded other business.
A major SAMOA contract was awarded to this firm, in spite of independent reports from the Investigations Department validating the conflicts of interest created by the firm's chairman working for a savings and loan. These reports were sent to the Senior Asset Manager, the Senior Contract Manager, and the Ethics Officer in the Dallas office.
The power of SAMOA: An illustration of the kind of unethical practices used by some SAMOA contractors is summarized in my memorandum dated July 9, 1991, which is attachment 2, which I will turn in.
In the memo to the assistant director of contracts at the Dallas Metroplex Consolidated Office, the asset management contractor is demanding a nonrefundable option fee of $3,000 to process a sales contract for the purchase of property. My memorandum was not re- sponded to, nor any action taken on, this petition.
A second illustration of the awesome power of the SAMOA Con- tractor is provided in a letter from Mr. Mike Doan, attachment No. 3, dated July 16, 1991.
In the letter, Mr. Doan states that not only is the SAMOA Con- tractor arbitrarily deciding who gets discounted deals on the prop- erties being sold, but the SAMOA contractor bragged about the fact that it would do no good to complain to the RTC.
In fact, in the past, complaints have been sent to former CEO's, but the purchaser still has to come back and deal with the SAMOA. This is the SAMOA which was number two in the bid I turned down.
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Such impunity was widespread, and it was one of the reasons why many subcontractors and buyers became discouraged and stopped trying to do business with the RTC.
The power of the contractor over friendly RTC's senior manage- ment- is further illustrated when you consider a letter that this same SAMDA contractor wrote, dated July 1, 1991, attachment No. 4, to the Dallas Regional Director.
The preliminary internal memorandum that I had written on June 25, 1991 [attachment 5], detailing wrong-doing, was already in the hands of the contractor to the extent that they had heard about the contents from several sources at the RTC's regional office and the Metroplex Consolidated Office.
It is probably just a strange coincidence that the special assistant to the then-regional director was also a former supervisor of the Chairman of the SAMDA Contractor who just happens to be in the direct pipeline for receiving RTC internal information.
Retribution measures: This is in November 1990. Suddenly, with- out formal explanation, I was relieved as contracting team leader and assigned duties as a librarian and FOIA response writer.
While I was hired as an LG-14 Contract Specialist and per- formed at that level, my new duties were those normally given to an LG-9 or LG-11 Apprentice Specialist.
As an illustration of how deeply ingrained this vindictiveness was with the assistant director of contracts and his two direct re- ports, I refer you to my memorandum dated April 8, 1992 [attach- ment 6], which addresses two shortcomings of RTC's information systems. As you are aware, timely information is a cornerstone of RTC being able to do business.
I observed that huge amounts of space was being used to store documents, £ind many hours of clerical time was spent retrieving documents. Also, many proposals, contracts, and other important documents are submitted to RTC by FAX. Because of the time zone differences, many of the FAX'd documents came into automatic ma- chines during off-duty hours.
There were times when I arrived early in the morning, as I usu- ally came in at 6 a.m., that FAX documents were literally strewn on the floor because the receiver box had overflowed. I suggested using a new imaging software and computer FAX board, since each contract specialist has a terminal.
A significant savings would result from reducing file storage space, document retrieval time, minimizing lost files, reducing lost time of standing at FAX machines, and having a chronological record of the FAX messages sent and received. The savings of the system was estimated to pay for the system in 90 days or less.
My immediate management would neither discuss the feasibility of these improvements, nor forward the analysis to the experts in information systems.
Recommendation: In closing, Mr. Chairman, I would like to state that there are still many dedicated, hardworking people within RTC who could do a much better job of restoring the confidence and resolving the crisis if, number one, the hard-core senior man- agement at the field offices and headquarters, who were respon- sible for the problems that I have addressed, were removed.
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They do not believe that the new initiatives that Secretary Bent- sen introduced will work, since they have an inherent vested inter- est in maintaining the old system. After all, it was the system — it was they who designed the old system, and to make any new^sys- tem work would be absolute proof that their former approach was wrong. This is tantamount to self-incrimination, and no one can ex- pect them to put a diligent effort into such a cause.
Second, contracting should be placed on an equal basis with asset management, operations, and legal.
Since the majority of the RTC's business is done by outside con- tracts an objective, independent contracting group is essential.
This is a fundamental management flaw to have the contracting officers identified as organizational second-class citizens.
The pressure from over-zealous managers who are quick to let it be known that they control your paycheck can subvert even the most objective contracting officers.
Again I thank you for the opportunity to appear before this com- mittee.
The Chairman. [Presiding.] Thank you, very much, for your statement. It is a very important statement, and we are grateful to have it.
Let me now go to Ms. Debbie Sherrill who, as I said earlier, is a Claims Settlement Agent in the Atlanta, GA, office of the RTC.
She is going to go ahead and give her testimony at this time. Thank you.
TESTIMONY OF DEBBIE SHERRILL, RESOLUTION TRUST CORPORATION, CLAIMS SETTLEMENT AGENT, ATLANTA, GA
Ms. Sherrill. Thank you. Chairman Riegle. I am Debbie Sherrill, and I am from the Atlanta office. I am currently employed with RTC. My contract will be up November 9.
Because, like several other people on this panel, I raised ques- tions, they told me when my contract was up. They told me that they didn't have to give me a reason. So I really don't know why.
But I am here today basically as a concerned Taxpayer as well as an RTC employee to explain to this committee all the waste, and abuse, and the fraud, and mismanagement that I have seen and that I have personally experienced at RTC.
I have three areas of concern that I would like to discuss. My first one is unqualified personnel in key management positions. Second, contractor fraud and abuse. Third, waste and abuse due to mismanagement.
A prime example of unqualified managers is that we now have a director who, prior to working for RTC, held a position as a sec- retary-receptionist. We had another director, and his job prior to RTC was a butcher at a meat market.
Now there is nothing wrong with these positions. I am not saying that. But I am saying it does not lend the experience that is needed to be a manager in a corporation such as RTC.
So what you have is unqualified, incompetent managers just con- tributing to the chaos that already existed and losing more money because they don't have the background necessary to make a sound business decision. Because of these types of managers, I also found that employees would make suggestions for improvement and
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would be reprimanded and ridiculed in front of their peers for doing so.
It was basically from the insecurity of these managers, who took that as criticism because they did not know enough about the posi- tion to know it was really a good suggestion and that it might work, that suggestions for improvement were discouraged.
So the result of having these types of managers is that you get a fearful and demotivated staff who are afraid to say anything when they find a problem.
They only promote the people who are more incompetent than they are, so they will look good. And then you drive away the more qualified, experienced people through intimidation, or discrimina- tion, or harassment, you know, whatever they can get to work to make you leave.
The second point I wanted to talk about was contractor fraud and abuse.
One of the most common areas there is padding of bills. I have had bills submitted where I had one lady tell me that — well, when I questioned her bill — she did her work when she went back to the hotel. She had charged 6 or 7 hours overtime every night for 2 weeks. We were working at the bank until 7 or 8 o'clock that night. I am sure she was not staying up 6 or 7 hours more after she got in at night, and she never produced anything on paper to show me what she had done during that time, but she was studying, and she was formulating a memo.
I mean, you know, you do not sign off on those types of bills. You would have bills where a project should take 2 hours, and they would bill you for 6 hours. When you would raise questions like this with the managers that I am under, these bills are being paid anyway.
They will talk to the contractor. The contractor will produce a memo to justify why they have got that bill, even though you do not have the backup to prove that they really did that.
My result was that I would refuse to sign off on the bills, which caused me a lot of problems.
The next item of abuse would be underbidding of contracts. Once they have been awarded the contract, then they would increase the cost.
I had one bank where, just my department only, bid $95,000 to do the contract. Well, 2 weeks into the job they came back and re- submitted and they said, well. Debs, it looks like it is going to take about $270,000 to complete this project.
Well, that is not a whole lot of money, you know, considering ev- erything, but when you let me get away with it once, then they get another bid and they do it again and again. It does not take long for it to all add up. The idea is that you have opened the door for abuse, and you have given them an avenue to use.
Another large waste we have is delaying review of contractor work and responsive action when a problem occurs.
A prime example of this is, we had a firm who contracted to do appraisals on a branch facility, and the furniture, fixtures, and equipment in those facilities.
The project should have taken 3 to 4 days to complete. This guy did it in one day. We could not figure out how he did it.
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The people at the site, once they got the work product, were so upset because it was inaccurate and so inferior they did not want to pay the bill. They talked to the people in Atlanta.
The office in Atlanta decided to pay the gentleman, anyway. So now this is my bank, and it is time for me to find a purchaser for these branches and the assets.
When you look at the data that was on this appraisal, it was so inaccurate, furniture was listed that did not even exist. So I am sit- ting there trying to sell furniture that I do not have to people.
The RTC's response to this, when I questioned them about it, was to hire another contractor to do another appraisal. Then you will have a true picture of what you can sell.
Senator Kerry. Let me just ask you. You are saying that on this particular appraisal, items were appraised that you knew did not exist?
Ms. Sherrill. Right. When we checked the inventory listing, then the people at the site said, well, this is an old listing. This furniture does not exist anymore. It was broken; it was thrown away; it is not here. I mean the items were not physically there.
Just the proximity of the branches of the facilities where this work had to be done, there is no way they could have gotten to all the branches in one day. I mean, you physically could not even travel to them, much less try to do an actual appraisal on them.
Senator Kerry. What did people say to you when you raised the question about the fraudulent appraisal?
Ms. Sherrill. About doing another appraisal?
Senator Kerry. Well, did you say this appraisal was fraudulent and not valid?
Ms. Sherrill. Yes, we did. They said, well, we have already paid them for it. We will just have to get a second appraisal. I mean, the appraisal is worthless if you cannot use it.
Senator Kerry. Was a person hired again to do appraisals?
Ms. Sherrill. Yes, he was.
Senator Kerry. The same person was hired again to do apprais- als, even though they appraised things that did not exist?
Ms. Sherrill. Yes, sir. Another example of this is, we had a Big Six accounting firm that we should have canceled the contract on. The work they turned in was inaccurate. They did not meet dead- lines. They were very poor presentations.
I refused to sign off on a lot of the bills because they could not justify the hours. I refused to sign off on a lot of the data they turned in because it was wrong. We would send it back, and it may or may not be right.
But I discussed this with our managers and I discussed it with the accounting firm's managers, too, telling them: You need to re- place these people, or we need to cancel your contract. My manage- ment got very quiet and did not want to support that, even though I had documentation to prove the work was poor.
So the end result was that they got paid for the job; the contrac- tor, just as well as the appraisal people, are still submitting bids on other jobs and they are being awarded those contracts which, as a Taxpayer, makes me really angry because we are seeing them do this.
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This is a very fixable problem. That is why it upsets me so much, because we could put these people on a hold list very easily, pend- ing an investigation to clear their name over any work that is not correct, and not allow them to submit a bid until they have done so. It is not a hard thing to do. It is just that there is no one in my management that is willing to take that responsibility and put their name on a piece of paper that says this is what we have got to do.
Instead, what they do is say, well. Deb should have handled that differently. She should have talked to them sooner, or she should have done something else, because that is a much easier thing to do than to take responsibility yourself. When you have incompetent managers, that is what happens.
Another area of concern I have is that they hire contractors to audit other contractors. In my department we use contractors, so I have to audit their work. Then there is the PCR Review Commit- tee that comes in. It is an Internal Committee that audits my work. An IG comes in and audits the other work. Then GAO comes in and audits it ageiin. Then we hire a contractor to audit it one more time just to make sure everybody is right.
You know, it is ludicrous. If there is a problem, you do not need five audits to determine there is a problem. You will know it way before then.
Much of the work conducted by the contractors could be done in- house. We already have the trained staff to do it. Many times we find, just like in this case we were discussing with the appraisers and the example of the contractor, you are paying these people $100 to $125 an hour. They are untrained and inexperienced in the field. It is much cheaper for us to go out there and do it ourselves because we have to go out there and train them anyway.
Personally, I have a real problem sitting there training a gen- tleman who is getting paid $125 an hour for something I can do. He should be teaching me something, I do not need to be spoon- feeding him.
When I have talked to the managers about this type of thing, their reaction is: Don't worry about it. Congress wants us to hire more contractors. Well, that is good. In some cases we need more contractors, but not this type of attitude. The attitude is: If you have a task that you do not want to do, you hire a contractor to do it. You do not worry about the money.
The joke around the office is that you call Congress and tell them to go to the basement and print more money.
Now to me as a Taxpayer, I did not think that was funny. It real- ly ticked me off, because I see the money going out the window.
If you do not conduct a timely oversight of the contractors, you might as well not do the audit at all, because it is just like in these cases where we have given them new jobs.
If you refuse to pay a bill and they sue you and you do not audit them until a year later, even if you can prove they are wrong, if you hired them for three more jobs it does not matter. The point is, then, what is the difference? It could not have been too bad; you hired them again. We shoot ourselves in the foot everywhere we go.
My last topic is waste and abuse due to mismanagement. I will make this brief. I know we could have stories all day long.
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I had one assignment where I was to wait for them to bring a permanent person into the field. So we set up deadlines and key meetings with purchasing banks to do the transition.
The gentleman never showed up. So we finally got concerned about it. I called the offices in Atlanta, and they said, well, come on by.
After I got back to Atlanta, the banks called and said, well, we found the gentleman that we were looking for. He had a drinking problem and he had passed out, and the local police had taken him back to the hotel.
He still did not show up for kev meetings where he was needed. He was abusive to the staff verbally. They were afraid of him.
I wrote a memo to the director. The president of the acquiring bank called our director. Nothing was done about it. It finally got to the point where the president of the acquiring bank got so angry he decided the best thing to do was call CNN, and he put it on the news. He thought if he put it on the news, it would get him out of town.
So when the managers realized that they really were going to do something drastic, they pulled the gentleman back in and replaced him with someone else. A few months down the road, the gen- tleman gets a promotion. In the private sector he would have been fired that day. There were no reprimands.
The last point I would like to make on the mismanagement is that I have heard so many times, between the directors and the de- partment heads and the supervisors at all levels, thev sit down and they will tell all of us, that RTC is a special entity that is not held accountable under the regular rules and regulations of other Gov- ernment agencies. Well, if we are not held accountable under those rules and regulations, where are we held accountable? Most of the time, we are not.
The policies and procedures are written. The manuals are sitting around, but no one is enforcing them because it goes back to the incompetent managers. Again, everyone is afi"aid to make a state- ment and take responsibility for anything.
Senator Kerry. Let me just ask across the board here. Is there anybody who disagrees with that in this entire group?
Panel Members. [Simultaneously.] Not at all.
Senator Kerry. Not one person disagrees. This is imiform. No- body is enforcing any of the regs? Is that correct?
Panel Members. [Simultaneously.] Right.
Senator Kerry. And you are saying that this fellow who was an alcoholic, who repeatedly had problems, who did not show up for work for weeks at a time, was promoted?
Ms. Sherrill. Yes, sir. He was brought back into the office. Then, later when it was time for his evaluations, he got a pro- motion.
Senator Kerry. Not withstanding that the police had held him at one point when he did not show up, and that there were re- peated occurrences?
Ms. Sherrill. What can I say? It was not my decision.
Senator Kerry. Thank you.
Ms. Sherrill. But your bottom-line result from this is that when you have managers doing this type of management style to your
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employees, your only retaliation is to abuse sick time. They abuse overtime. And then the employers, the managers' retaliation is through intimidation, harassment, and discrimmation. So in one way or another, they will get you to leave if you raise questions.
In conclusion, I guess what I really wanted to get across to this committee before I left, to me RTC is operating strictly on a crisis management basis. I wanted to motivate this committee to realize how serious it is and to try to get it to take some measures to cor- rect the problem.
Thank you.
The Chairman. [Presiding.] Thank you very much, and thank you for coming forward and giving us that testimony today.
Mr. Henderson, you are an FDIC employee. You are on assign- ment to the RTC and vou handle documentation on legal contract- ing for the Atlanta, GA, office of the RTC. May I ask, sir, how long have you been in Government? How long has your career spanned?
TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM A. HENDERSON, RESOLUTION TRUST CORPORATION, LEGAL INFORMATION TECHNICIAN, AT- LANTA,GA
Mr. Henderson. Since 1981.
The Chairman. So you are finishing 12 years or so of Govern- ment service?
Mr. Henderson. Correct.
The Chairman. You have that span of history yourself over which to make the observations you are about to make?
Mr. Henderson. Correct.
The Chairman. Very good. We are pleased to have you, and we would like to hear your statement now.
Mr. Henderson. Thank you. My name is William A. Henderson. I reside in Atlanta. I am presently working with the RTC office in the Legal Division of Atlanta as a Legal Information Technician. My responsibilities are to input and monitor financial data of fees and expenses from outside counsel involving cases that arise out of failed S&L's.
With all good intentions of FIRREA, which is better known in our office as diarrhea, because it wipes us out. It is cleaning us out financially, since its inception, the RLIS unit for which I work has been plagued by mismanagement.
Attorneys representing outside law firms with overdue RTC bills have been allowed to enter the RLIS unit, oftentimes unescorted. This is a breach of security and also a violation of delegated au- thority to approve payment of bills. Only attorneys are supposed to initiate authorization for payment of bills. Support staff has been seen authorizing fraudulently, payment of bills.
Due to management's negligence, I have seen duplicate, even triplicate payments dispensed to law firms for a single invoice for legal services. Such blatant negligence and unethical practices di- rectly violates the RTC's mission to maximize return and minimize the losses of managed and resolved savings and loans.
Senator Kerry. Were these duplicate and triplicate payments ever recouped?
Mr. Henderson. No.
Senator Kerry. Ever recouped?
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Mr. Henderson. Never.
Senator Kerry. Were they brought to management's attention?
Mr. Henderson. They were brought to management's attention, and a memo was E-Mailed and sent from Washington to encourage everybody to try and recoup payments that had been processed. Many times the firms had gone out of business anyway. It was really a scam.
The Chairman. What size checks would these have been?
Mr. Henderson. Anywhere from $5,000 to $50,000.
The Chairman. So these were big checks? These are not small checks?
Mr. Henderson. Whoppers. Yes.
The RTC was inundated with many moves of personnel, and this boils down to a physical waste as well as a financial waste. Several sections in the Division of the RTC were required to move three or more times in a year from one floor to another. Professional movers were hired. Boxes were loaded on trucks and moved from one building to another, from one floor to the next floor. Generally the moves lasted approximately 8 hours per trip.
The professionals moved, the contractor billed, and the RTC paid. The employees of the moved section or division were unable to per- form their designated tasks for the entire work day. Therefore, the entire section or division was incapacitated for an entire work day. There is a total disregard for Federal rules and regulations.
The flagrant disregard for rules and regulations is pervasive throughout the RTC. Managers oflen chide: "We are RTC, not FDIC." Or, this does not apply to the RTC. Therefore implying that RTC does not have to abide by the same rules and regulations as the FDIC.
Management's perception that RTC is a quasi-organization has bred an atmosphere of arrogance. Since they believe they are not a full-fledged Governmental agency, they have a mandate to pick and choose which Federal regulations and rules they want to fol- low, and those they wish to disregard. This has led to numerous EEO complaints and to Office of Personnel violations.
In regard to EEO and some of the oversight agencies, the RTC has reduced the EEO to a puppet operation. EEC's autonomy to re- solve complaints without management interference is nonexistent.
Currently the RTC's EEO office is clogged with complaints that are still in the informal, preliminary stage of the complaint process and have been stalled in that stage for more than a year.
As an EEO representative, I have represented at least five com- plainants in the past year and a half. During that time, I have wit- nessed management's refusal to cooperate with EEO officials. This refusal to cooperate includes failure to provide investigators with requests for documents and oral testimony.
As a result, investigators have difficulty following the EEO time- table which governs every step of the complaint process. Therefore, employees have no viable means of resolving discrimination com- plaints against RTC.
Even in its investigatory stage, each complaint costs $70,000. With these five complaints alone, the investigation is costing $350,000, which they had no business incurring at all. With the
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proper management and the proper counseling, these complaints could have been resolved at the drop of a hat.
In conclusion, reprisals and nonrenewable contracts, harassment and intimidation are the risks many will bear here today. The RTC's discriminatory practices and unethical behavior have bred an atmosphere of distrust and paranoia within the organization.
Management's disregard for regulation and business ethics is a direct result and an insult to legislative authority and sets a dan- gerous precedent which undermines the authority of elected offi- cials.
The RTC was created to rid the banking establishment of sick S&L's. Instead, it created a sick agency. Taxpayers are hemorrhag- ing financially externally, and now they are nemorrhaging inter- nally.
It is my hope that my testimony today illustrates the need to provide meaningful solutions to the problems which ail the RTC. In my opinion, there may be a need for an appointment of a Special Prosecutor.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Henderson.
I have some thoughts about what you have said here, and some ideas. Senator Metzenbaum and I are both discussing how best to follow up on the various things that are being set out here.
I think I will hold that until just a little bit later.
Senator Metzenbaum. If I could, Mr. Chairman, could I take just a moment to congratulate you and your staff and these people? Each of them deserve a chapter in that famous book of John F. Kennedy's Profiles in Courage. It takes guts to come before a Sen- ate Committee and talk about your present employer, or your former employer.
You people are absolutely wonderful. You give me some reassur- ance that there is some hope in our Government. But some of the things that you are telling us cause us to just want to sit here and cry because, while we fight so hard aroimd here to find some money for some needed program — whether it is education, or feed- ing, or health, or whatever tne case may be — this is an agency that has been wasting, wasting, wasting money.
No matter who is at the head of it, we could not get any action. We have just blown not "millions" but "billions" of dollars on law- yers and accountants who have been working with them and who have ripped off the system. The people working the system have ripped it off, and you people are absolute giants.
Mr. Chairman, I want to tell you that you and your committee staff deserve a lot of credit. I am sure it was not easy to find some- body in one city, and somebody some place else, but you have done a magnificent job. It is a privilege for me to have an opportunity to sit here and work with you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
I think it should be noted, too, that everybody who has testified is testifying under oath. People do not do that lightlv. I take what is being said to be the truth, even without the oatn, but I think the fact that people have come in here and understand that they are testifying on that basis adds great weight to the credibility of what they are saying.
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I think, too, as we listen to these individual stories from different areas, we see this pattern. You see a clearer pattern emerging here where the same difficulties are infecting the RTC all over tne place. That is why I think it is so important. We will hold until later our thoughts as to what we will do next.
Let me now turn to Ms. Deanna Smith. We are pleased to have you. Pull that mike right up close. We would like to have you go ahead and make your statement.
TESTIMONY OF DEANNA SMITH, RESOLUTION TRUST COR- PORATION, LEGAL DIVISION, ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT [FORMER EMPLOYEE, CURRENTLY WITH FDICl, ATLANTA, GA
Ms. Smith. My name is Deanna Smith, I am pleased to appear before the committee today in response to your request concerning my experience at the RTC.
I am today employed by the FDIC in the Atlanta Regional Office as Administrative Assistant with responsibility for payroll and travel vouchers,
I had one particular experience at the RTC which I believe rep- resents a clear case of waste, fraud, and abuse. I held a similar po- sition at the RTC to the one I have now at the FDIC.
I was originally hired by the FDIC Legal Division in the Atlanta Regional Office. FDIC trained me in the handling of vouchers and receipts by employees when they claim reimbursement for busi- ness-related expenses.
Obviously one of the main things you are looking for when you handle such vouchers is to protect the FDIC insurance funds by making sure that people are not getting paid by the Government for personal business. I was trained by the FDIC to look out for such practices. Our office was converted from the Atlanta Regional Office of the FDIC to the Eastern Regional Office of the RTC, which is Taxpayer funded.
After management was changed from FDIC to RTC in 1991, I found an apparent problem on a travel voucher submitted by the new Deputy Regional Counsel. The nature of the problem was charging a rental car for personal use and billing the RTC.
I was asked to review the manager's travel voucher prior to its formal submission, and I did so. When I did, I confronted him about the rental car charge. He acknowledged that he had used the car for personal business, I told him he was not authorized to charge personal expenses on the Government's Diner's Club charge card, and I wanted to give him an opportunity to correct the vouch- er before he submitted it for reimbursement and auditing.
He screamed at me and he told me that I didn't know my job. I told him that it was very hard for me to confront someone in his position with this, and hoped it would not be held against me. I told him that I would call Washington about this. He told me that he would call Washington, as well, I called Washington and spoke with the person in the Travel Unit. I asked if the charge was ap- propriate, and whether I was correct.
They told me I was, I told them they might want to start pulling his vouchers to check them. They told me to tell him the charge was wrong and that he should not do it again. I relayed the mes-
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sage to him and it made him even madder. Nothing was ever done to discipline him that I know of. I do not recall seeing the voucher again. I have no way of knowing whether he corrected the voucher. If he did not correct the voucher, I do not know whether he ever paid the charge back.
I later heard from employees in other offices that he had a prob- lem with travel vouchers. As of today, this manager is still at the RTC.
Needless to say, I believe I experienced retaliation as a result of having insisted on following the rules and reporting the travel voucher problem. Several times it had been suggested to me by the head of the office that I would be selected for an administrative as- sistant training position which had promotion potential. I was not selected.
RTC later sought to relocate me to the Philadelphia RTC office, which I fought. About 18 months after the incident, I was fortunate to be returned to the FDIC. This experience was very chilling to me. It makes me hesitant to pick up the phone to report waste, fraud, or abuse to the Inspector General Hot Line because, if I do, someone may find out and I may be punished.
As a Taxpayer, I was also very angry because it was a case of the Grovernment being ripped off.
I would like to thank the committee for the opportunity to testify today.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
I want to thank you, as well as I have said to the others, for com- ing forward today.
Let me now go to you, Ms. LePique. Annette LePique is the Sec- tion Chief of the Affordable Housing Unit in the Newport Beach, CA, office of the RTC. We welcome you, and we want you to give us your statement now.
TESTIMONY OF ANNETTE LePIQUE, RESOLUTION TRUST COR- PORATION, SECTION CHIEF, AFFORDABLE HOUSING UNIT, NEWPORT BEACH, CA
Ms. LePique. Thank you, Chairman Riegle, and thank you to all the Members of the committee for inviting me to appear here today.
I am here to speak about my personal experiences at the RTC regarding waste and mismanagement specifically as it relates to the handling of claims of discrimination and sexual harassment at the California office.
I was promoted in July 1990, to the California offiice in the posi- tion of an affordable housing specialist. I have a Masters Degree in Administration. I have 15 years experience in affordable hous- ing. I considered this a tremendous career opportunity.
RTC's Affordable Housing Program was created by FIRREA in 1989. I was proud to be a part of it then, and I am proud to be a part of it now. We have developed housing opportunities for thou- sands of low- and moderate-income Americans and Taxpayers, as well. It has been considered a silver lining to the cloud of the sav- ings and loan crisis.
But there is one storm cloud that has hovered, and I believe it is the result of the California office's total lack of any affirmative
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action hiring, which has led to gender-based discrimination and sexual harassment at that office.
For 2V2 years I was subjected to sexist remarks, suggestions, and actions, creating a hostile work environment at the most senior level. A previous complaint against one particular individual re- sulted in absolutely no action, and he was promptly promoted. His actions always involved subordinate women. But then women are virtually nonexistent in senior management at the RTC.
As a witness in a previous EEOC complaint in 1991, I was a prime target for retaliation. My harasser wheeled tremendous power in the California office, especially with the arrival of Mr. A. J. Felton from the Atlanta office, a close personal friend of Stan- ley Tate's and Phillip V. Jones, Jr.
Friends were promoted, and others were not. Among those "oth- ers" could always be counted females and minorities. Even though I was recommended for promotion by my current supervisor, it was denied by Mr. Phillip Jones.
In filing my EEO complaint in November 1992, I found that the California office had never even bothered to appoint EEO coun- selors. So my complaint was handled by an investigator in the Kan- sas City office. The investigation was thorough. It was well docu- mented, and it was completed in 30 days. It affirmed my complaint and the results were given to senior managers over the phone the same day it was completed.
Filing an EEO complaint is sometimes referred to as "protected activity," but I had to ask: Protected activity for whom? The same day I filed my complaint I received my first ever adverse personnel action fi-om Mr. Jones, within 7 hours of the filing. He is not even my supervisor. I dared to take a swing at the good old boy system, and my pimishment was about to begin.
During the EEO investigation, senior managers began investiga- tions of their own of me personally and my department. When this produced nothing they could use against me, I was made — forced to attend a meeting and given four back-dated annual performance reviews, all showing progressively deteriorating performance on my part. Two of these were for a period I had already been reviewed, and although my attorney attempted to attend the meeting — be- cause by that time I was forced to retain counsel — ^he was thrown out by senior managers of the office.
At the very same time, during this very same period, nothing was being done to the harasser other than a transfer to another ex- ecutive level position.
In a letter to my attorney, Mr. Felton, the Vice President of the California office, denied the existence of an original annual per- formance review, even though it was submitted as an attachment to my EEO complaint.
In terms of waste and mismanagement relative to this complaint, a total of four EEO investigations were done and were filed by Ms. Sandra Crisman, who will speak next. These alone have cost the Taxpayers tens of thousands of dollars.
In addition, management ordered four additional reviews in- tended to discredit us, rather than getting to the truth. They al- ready knew the truth. These additional needless reviews involved
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over 100 employees of the RTC's California and DC offices, took months to complete, and cost hundreds of thousands of dollars.
Each additional review only confirmed what the EEO office had established. Both female department heads had more than accept- able work records to be promoted. Sexual harassment and discrimi- nation and retaliation had occurred. And Ms. Crisman and I were the victims, not senior management, and it emanated from the very top.
The last report that was done actually found several more vic- tims of sexual harassment who had never reported that. Reactions by the senior management of California was swift. My harasser was put on special assignment to Home Fed Bank in San Diego for a period of 5 months, which translated to a 5-month vacation be- cause he did not go to work during that period.
All expenses were paid. That was at an approximate cost of $2,700 a week to the Taxpayer. These were two more months of ad- ministrative paid leave until he was finally terminated by the Washington, DC, office as California senior managers remained si- lent on the issue.
In conclusion, I want to say that the senior managers most re- sponsible for the situation in California have received no sanctions at all.
My personnel file, on the other hand, is full of adverse actions since November 1992. In fact, one of the people found to have dis- criminated, Mr. Phillip Jones, was recently promoted to our DC of- fice.
Victims in California remain uncompensated, although settle- ment discussions with myself and Sandra Crisman have com- menced.
I would like to commend our EEO office in DC for their handling of this, but they cannot unring the bell. Many people have lost. Valuable employees have lefl, totally frustrated by the system. One woman lefl shortly after her filing because she could not get a pro- motion or a significant job assignment.
A female attorney was fired for asking that women be promoted. Another female manager was demoted after filing her complaint and resigned and moved — Kozak style like the Soviet Union, per- haps in search of more freedom than the RTC offers.
Most just suffer in silence, afraid of termination or other tjrpes of retaliation. I have suffered. At the RTC, boys will be boys, and when they get in trouble they all take care of each other, and we all have to pay for it.
Please, even as the RTC prepares to sunset, for those of us who have never been members of the boys club and never will be, help RTC management at the highest level recognize the value in a di- verse workplace, one that reflects the face of America.
Thank you, very much.
The Chairman. Thank you for coming forward. It is the intention of this committee on all the items that are being presented today,
f>ersonal and more broadly generic items, to initiate actions to fol- ow up on each of them.
I do not want this stuff buried under either a wall of silence or anything else. So your coming and talking is not the end of this process. We will take these things forward. I want you to under-
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stand that we hear what you are saying. I am very upset about what you have said.
So let me now proceed
Senator Metzenbaum. Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Metzenbaum.
Senator Metzenbaum. Ms. LePique, in your statement you refer to the fact that Mr. Felton was a personal friend of Mr. Stanley Tate.
Ms. LePique. That is correct.
Senator Metzenbaum. Mr. Tate at that time was on the Board of Overseers of the RTC?
Ms. LePique. That is correct.
Senator Metzenbaum. Do you read anything more into that, other than your statement? You know he is up tor confirmation to be Chairman of the RTC?
Ms. LePique. Absolutely.
Senator Metzenbaum. Being a personal friend in and of itself is not necessarily a negative fact, unless there was some way he was involved, or he should have shared some responsibility in this situ- ation.
Ms. LePique. That Mr. Felton should have shared some respon- sibility?
Senator Metzenbaum. Mr. Tate.
Ms. LePique. No.
I am just saying that Mr. Felton has been protected, I believe, because of his association with him, as has Mr. Jones, as have most of the people involved. As I said, they stick together. They are all culpable in my evaluation. That is what I have read into the EEO investigation that was done by the RTC.
Their own internal EEO Department did an investigation using an outside contractor, and that is what the contractor found.
Senator Metzenbaum. Thank you, very much.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Metzenbaum.
Ms. Crisman, we would like to hear from you, now. Thank you for coming.
Just pml that mike around. When you are ready, we would like your statement.
TESTIMONY OF SANDRA CRISMAN, RESOLUTION TRUST COR- PORATION, DEPARTMENT HEAD, CONTRACTS DEPARTMENT, NEWPORT BEACH, CA
Ms. Crisman. Good afternoon. My name is Sandra Crisman. I am a Manager in the Contracts Department of the RTC's Newport Beach, CA, office.
I would like to begin by thanking the Chairman of the committee for the invitation to appear today. I am here to describe my per- sonal experience with gender-based discrimination at the RTC.
I believe my experiences can be summarized in five statements. First, I was denied a promotion that I had earned. Second, man- agement's attempts to justify the denial were false and inappropri- ate. Third, management's stated standards of performance were not applied consistently between male and female department heads. Fourth, following the filing of my EEO complaint, manage- ment engaged in acts of reprisal against me. And fifth, despite the
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RTC's confirmation of discrimination and reprisal in my case, the RTC's executive management here in Washington promoted the in- dividual who discriminated against me.
My professional career spans both the public and the private sec- tors. Prior to joining the RTC, I had 5 years' experience with the Internal Revenue Service in human resources management, and 3 years' experience in aerospace contracting with a private contrac- tor. I possess a Bachelor's Degree in Management, and a Master's Degree in Finance.
My employment with the RTC began in July 1990, when I was hired by the California office as a contract specialist. In July 1991, I was promoted to Department Head and told by my supervisor that if my performance was satisfactory, I would be promoted to the full working level of the position in 1 year.
During that year, I received a "Superior" performance award, and at the end of the year I received an "Excellent" performance review from my supervisor, with laudatory comments from her su- pervisor.
My promotion was recommended by two levels of management above me. However, when it reached the desk of Mr. Phillip Jones, Assistant Vice President, it was denied. I was told that Mr. Jones wanted to wait and see if the California office had met its sales goals. However, I had never been told my performance would be tied to the sales of the office. This requirement was not in my posi- tion description, nor was it a factor on my performance evaluation.
I was aware that a promotion in the Contracts Department had just been approved for a male contract specialist. I was also aware that male department heads in the California office were routinely promoted.
Therefore, in August 1992, I filed an EEO complaint. During the EEO investigation, management changed its reasons for denying the promotion. Mr. Jones stated that a poor program compliance review and findings in the Inspector General's report were the rea- sons for the denial, but the facts do not support this.
The program compliance review was fully acceptable as con- firmed by the lead reviewer in the EEO investigation. The Inspec- tor General's office has confirmed that there was no derogatory in- formation about me or anyone who worked for me in the report ref- erenced by Mr. Jones.
In a further attempt to justify their actions, senior management stated that they do not promote supervisors whose program compli- ance reviews showed deficiencies until those deficiencies are cor- rected.
If this is management's policy, then it must be consistently ap- plied to males and females. This is not happening in the California office. The EEO investigation confirmed that male managers whose departments had significant deficiencies noted in their formal re- views did not have their promotions withheld pending resolution of the deficiencies. Instead, they were promptly promoted.
After filing my complaint, management took actions which con- stituted reprisal. Senior management immediately ordered a re- view of the contracts department by a local team. Although the out- come was favorable, they ordered yet another review, this time
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from the Washington oflRce and at least ten individuals came for one full week. The final report rated the department as excellent.
Needless to say, these reviews consumed countless hours for both the auditors and the 35 members of the contract department staff. No other department, with the exception of affordable housing which is also headed by a female, Annette LePique, has been sub- jected to multiple reviews such as this.
The EEO investigation has now concluded and confirmed dis- crimination in my case. A resolution is pending.
I would like to comment that the RTC's Washington office of Equal Employment Opportimity has been very responsive since January 1993. They have made efforts to educate all managers within the organization about sexual harassment and discrimina- tion.
Until recently, I believed that management throughout the orga- nization was making a good-faith effort to eradicate the discrimina- tion. However, I am here today because this is not the case. The individual who denied my promotion, Mr. Phillip Jones, has been recently promoted to the Washington, DC, office.
I am personally outraged by the Corporation's decision to pro- mote this individual. He not only discriminated against me, but he was found to have discriminated against Annette LePique, who just spoke. By its actions, the RTC is clearly saying that its managers are not held accountable for their discriminatory actions. I find this situation untenable.
I believe that RTC supports the good old boy network, at the most senior ranks of management, which is wny Mr. Jones was promoted in spite of his discriminatory activity. Clearly manage- ment at RTC has abdicated responsibility for correcting discrimina- tion and reprisal within the organization.
I am thankful to the Members of the committee for their concern and exhort you to put an end to this heinous conduct.
Senator Kerry. [Presiding.] Thank you very much, Ms. Crisman. I appreciate that.
Let me just say, as a Senator I am outraged enough — I think if I were a woman, I would be feeling very powerless and very frus- trated and super angry at this notion
Ms. Crisman. Yes.
Senator Kerry. — ^that there seems to be a reward, not with- standing findings, and it is certainly something that the committee will inquire about.
Ms. Crisman. Thank you.
Senator Kerry. Mr. Hans Mangelsdorf is the Senior Property Manager in the Newport Beach, CA, RTC.
Mr. Mangelsdorf
TESTIMONY OF HANS MANGELSDORF, PESOLUTION TRUST CORPORATION, ASSET SPECIALIST, NEWPORT BEACH, CA
Mr. Mangelsdorf. I would like to first express my appreciation
Senator Kerry. If I could ask each of you, I know we are almost toward the end of the line, but if you could keep it tight, as most of you have, and it has been very helpful.
Thank you.
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Mr. Mangelsdorf. Thank you for allowing me the opportunity to speak here today. My comments are based on my tenure at the RTC and 17 years experience in California real estate and the sav- ings and loan industry
Senator Kerry. Pull that mike a little closer and speak up a lit- tle bit.
Mr. Mangelsdorf. The stated philosophy of RTC's management is that nothing will stand in the way of the RTC, Nothing. Not the rules, not the regulations
Senator Kerry. How long did you work there?
Mr. Mangelsdorf. At the RTC?
Senator Kerry. Yes.
Mr. Mangelsdorf. I am still an employee at the RTC. I started in June 1990.
Senator Kerry. 1990?
Mr. Mangelsdorf. That is correct.
Senator Kerry. Your job is what?
Mr. Mangelsdorf. I am an Asset Specialist and Institutional Oversight Manager.
Senator Kerry. Your background?
Mr. Mangelsdorf. Asset management in the savings and loan and real estate industries.
Senator Kerry. How long have you been involved in that?
Mr. Mangelsdorf. Seventeen years.
Senator Kerry. What is your educational background?
Mr. Mangelsdorf. I have 106 college units including the Uni- versity of Southern California.
Senator Kerry. You say you have worked in this area for 17 years?
Mr. Mangelsdorf. Yes sir, I have.
Senator Kerry. Ever in the public sector, previously?
Mr. Mangelsdorf. No sir, I have not.
Senator Kerry. In the course of your 17 year experience in the private sector, did you work for any corporate entities?
Mr. Mangelsdorf. Yes, I did. Wells Fargo Bank and American Savings & Loan.
Senator Kerry. Have you ever run into any similar management practices in the course of those 17 years?
Mr. Mangelsdorf. Absolutely not.
Senator Kerry. Now why don't you describe what you ran into.
Mr. Mangelsdorf. OK. As I started to say, the stated philoso- phy of the RTC's management is that nothing will stand in the way of the RTC. Not the rules. Not the regulations. And certainly not RTC's employees. Consequences can be seen in the EEO arena, in RTC's operations and in the local economy.
I have served with the RTC since 1990. I have worked at Colum- bia Savings, Pacific Savings, Santa Barbara Savings, and Great American Savings, some of the largest savings and loans to come across our office.
During this period, a pattern of covert activity, mismanagement, and misconduct has developed in the California office. I have ob- served illegal acts, and I have reported them to the Inspector Gen- eral's office. I have been asked to do things that I simply just wouldn't do.
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Charges of harassment and reprisal are pervasive. The place is really out of control. It is abusive, and it is completely demoralizing for an employee.
RTC's own independent investigations have confirmed these alle- gations. However, RTC has limited its corrective action.
As an example, I have supported Annette in the EEO process through testimony to the Inspector General's office, GAO, the EEOC, and numerous in-house investigations. Since then, I have received reprimands, written warnings, my first-ever poor em- ployee evaluation, and continual denial of promised promotion. I have always been a top producer at the office.
While independent EEO investigations have validated my allegations
Senator Kerry. Let me just ask you. Did your negative apprais- als only begin after you became a thorn in the side, so to speak?
Mr. Mangelsdorf. Absolutely.
While the independent EEO investigations have validated my al- legation and recommended settlement, no corrective action has been taken. It is the RTC's price for telling the truth.
Voicing my opinion is part of my job description. It seems that every time I do, I suffer. My supervisors are hostile and they open- ly call me a "native," meaning
Senator Kerry. Call you a what?
Mr. Mangelsdorf. A "native" — meaning that constructive criti- cism has no place at the RTC.
RTC is dumping assets as rapidly as possible through auctions. Structured sales transactions have endangered the local economies. Unfortunately, not only have the past real estate auctions disposed of property using steep discounts, but high operating costs have substantially reduced return to the Taxpayers.
Property slated for auction is taken off the market for months at a time, regardless of market interest. In other words, we could have an offer pending, and they would send it off to an auction, like Mr. O'Bryon was saying earlier, to create a pretty auction for the public.
A typical minimum bid for property at the RTC is 30 percent less than the appraised value. Auction selling costs are reportedly 22 percent, and sometimes even more, of the selling price compared to an industry auction at 17 percent. Using a local real estate broker costs about 6 percent. That is a big difference.
In effect, the RTC and the American Taxpayer pay a high cost of sale to achieve a discounted sales price. The difference means millions.
A little earlier we talked about a $500 million difference. I would concur with that figure for the present. I think if the RTC contin- ues, that will easily be $1 billion, or maybe even more. I think that is a lot of money.
Senator Kerry. Is that the necessary price of disposing of this property? Or could something else be done?
Mr. Mangelsdorf. Oh, ^solutely there are alternative meas- ures available to the RTC.
Senator Kerry. Such as what?
Mr. Mangelsdorf. Well, direct sales for one thing.
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The public comes to the RTC and the demand is high. I receive 20, 30, sometimes 50 and 100 calls every dav. I talk to at least 20 and 30 Taxpayers every dav. I could readily sell the property. I have the wherewithal to do it. Instead, I have to send them through a complex and convoluted system, which is frustrating for the Taxpayer and frustrating for the employees of the RTC.
Senator Kerry. To what degree does that svstem protect against a kind of — an alternative kind of fraud or mvoritism that might enter the system of people just cutting their own deals without a systemic approach? I mean, could you have accountability?
Mr. Mangelsdorf. I worked at American Savings just prior to coming to the RTC. I was their corporate broker in handling the disposition of their real estate assets.
I was accountable to the Taxpayers. I was also accountable to the shareholders of the Association. My work was an open book, as it is at the RTC. There really is no difference except that in the pri- vate sector there is one guy I look to, myself. In Government, there are dozens. The ability to find out who might be culpable in any action is difficult.
Senator Kerry. But what you are saying is that there could have been an alternative structure of sale that would have been equally as accountable, but far more profitable? Is that correct?
Mr. Mangelsdorf. Absolutely.
Senator Kerry. Do you concur with that, Mr, O'Bryon?
Mr. O'Bryon. Absolutely.
Senator Kerry. I do not mean to interrupt his testimony.
Mr. O'Bryon. The RTC has so many different levels of delegated authority, and so many of the people who are involved within that level of delegated authority in making a decision about something as simple as selling a $50,000 condo, as an example, you may have to go through 7 or 8 different steps and layers.
You might have to go in front of a committee who absolutely has no experience and knowledge of what is happening in the market- place, no experience or knowledge of what is happening to real es- tate of that particular type, making a decision and asking you, the asset specialist, to justity your accepting an offer.
Now when I was working there, I remember one time I had a full-price offer on a condo. I sent it up to my boss. He sent it back saying you need to write a case study, and if you have got a full- price offer then something is wrong. We cannot accept the first offer.
I never got the property sold, quite honestly. The levels and the layers are archaic and ridiculous.
Senator Kerry. Let me come back, if I can, to Mr. Mangelsdorf.
I understand there were occasions where fraudulent information was passed on to the U.S. Congress in its efforts to try to evaluate this process. Is that accurate?
Mr. Mangelsdorf. I recall a time that I was asked to produce sales documentation where we were reporting to the Congress of the United States, however, it was taking too long for us to manu- facture the numbers. Management asked us to stop where we were, double it, and add 10. Those were the numbers that were presented to you.
Senator Kerry. So it was just a total ballpark figure?
46
Mr. Mangelsdorf. An unqualified guess.
Senator Kerry. An unqualified guess?
Mr. Mangelsdorf. Absolutely.
Senator Kerry. And that guess was as to what? The amount of sales value? What was it pertaining to?
Mr. Mangelsdorf. Amount of the sales value, yes.
Senator KERRY. The amount of sales value
Mr. Mangelsdorf. Yes.
Senator Kerry. — that had been produced? Or was to be pro- duced?
Mr. Mangelsdorf. Sales production that had been produced.
Senator Kerry. That had been produced?
Mr. Mangelsdorf. Yes.
Senator Kerry. So in effect, you were providing us with figures alleging production that had not in fact taken place?
Mr. Mangelsdorf. Production was overstated.
The Chairman. More than "overstated." You say that it was dou- bled, and then they said to add 10. So it was misstated by
Mr. Mangelsdorf. A bunch.
The Chairman. Yes.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Mangelsdorf. Another avenue involves structured sales transactions where the RTC evaluates property based on its in- come.
Senator Kerry. How many times did that happen, to your per- sonal knowledge?
Mr. Mangelsdorf. Overstating the production?
Senator Kerry. Yes.
Mr. Mangelsdorf. Personally, once. I imagine several times in the early days. We just didn't have the ability to produce the type of information you all were looking for.
Senator Kerry. Is that ability there now?
Mr. Mangelsdorf. Yes.
Senator Kerry. It is there now?
Mr. Mangelsdorf. Yes.
Senator Kerry. Do you think this has been corrected at this point?
Mr. Mangelsdorf. Yes. I'll add that it's at a substantial cost.
The Chairman. What do you mean by that? Is there something we should know about the cost to get it fixed?
Mr. Mangelsdorf. I think the amount of money that we spent on the computer system, not being a computer expert, of course, is a great deal of money more than we probably had to spend.
The Chairman. You know, that issue has come up, if I may, sev- eral times today. Do you have the impression that there were con- tracting relationships here where friends, pals, or whatever tended to get these contracts, or was it just that there was such a gross level of incompetence that people were coming in and ripping off the agency and charging them, whether it was for legal work, com- puter work, or what have you, just a lot more than they should have been charging in terms of what they were delivering?
Mr. Mangelsdorf. I think my colleague from the Atlanta office hit the nail on top of the head. I think the quality of the manage- ment level of the RTC has got a lot to be desired. I feel that many
47
managers are promoted not for their wherewitiial but with the like- lihood that they will be sympathetic to existing management.
The Chairman. But I am interested in the question of whether or not this waste is just sheer incompetence or whether this kind of pattern of waste has to do with funneling money, in effect through inflated contracts, to favored people? And if any of you can cite examples of that, I want to hear that.
In other words, there's different ways to waste money. It's one thing to waste it just because it is sort of a Keystone Cops oper- ation at the management level, which is what you're describing. But I am also concerned that for the amounts of money that we're floating around here, if money was being passed out like that, that there may well be other patterns of where the money went, who got it, who didn't get it, that kind of thing. And I am concerned about the degree to which that may be part of this story. And, to the extent it is, that we get it identified and documented.
Mr. Mange LSDORF. OK
Mr. Henderson. I think it's a combination of both.
Mr. Mangelsdorf. I would agree with that.
Mr. Henderson. From the legal aspect, there have been numer- ous cases where large cases were funneled to a particular law firm that the head of the legal division had an interest in.
The Chairman. You mean actually had an interest in that law firm?
Mr. Henderson. He had a personal relationship with that law firm.
The Chairman. How do you mean?
Mr. Henderson. To put it blimtly, the person that she was fun- neling the cases to was a familiar acquaintance of hers.
The Chairman. So there was a personal relationship?
Mr. Henderson. Correct. And it's a combination. It's more like the Keystone Cops than anything else. It's a combination of things that go into this pot. Having worked for FDIC prior to going over to RTC, I can make the comparison and it's like night and day.
We had one particular case where there was a young lady, it was a paralegal, that caught an error in a $45,000 appropriation to a law firm. It turned up on the system as $450,000. The firm had al- ready been paid $60,000 over the $45,000. Her hell began when she found the error.
The Chairman. In other words, instead of giving her a pat on the back and maybe a promotion, she got hassled because she found the mistake.
Mr. Henderson. Correct.
The Chairman. Was that money ever reeled back in?
Mr. Henderson. No.
The Chairman. Do you want to try to finish, Mr. Mangelsdorf? I'm sorry.
Excuse me, you wanted to say something?
Mr. Pederson. I'm sorry, I know I'm out of order. But I wanted to refer the committee's attention to Exhibit six to the written statement which Ms. Taylor and I have provided this morning. It's a clear piece of evidence which goes directly to what you're refer- ring to. Friends at the RTC ^ving business to other personal friends on the outside to the detriment of the Taxpayers.
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The Chairman. Pull that mike right around, Ms. Taylor.
Ms. Taylor. I would like to add to that. In the Denver office there are several examples of legal business being sent to ex-man- agers from the legal department of the Denver office. I have not heard of that occurring with ex-lawyer members that were just staff attorneys. But there are several ex-department heads or sec- tion chief managers that have received business after they have left from the RTC.
And some of the people that worked for those people have told me that the business that they received was the business that they did not complete or were working on while they were at the RTC in many instances.
The Chairman. We will go into that when we get to your state- ments.
Mr. Romer.
Mr. RoMER. Yes. To add to this level of incompetence, at the de- partment head up in Dallas they had an automation committee, which normally takes care of how we can maybe save some money with computer technology. I have been working in computer tech- nology for 30 years. I made a definite request to serve on that com- mittee three different times. I was never given the opportunity and I know the computer capability of the total committee and they know nothing of the industry.
But I was not able to serve. The reason I joined RTC is because of my background. I thought I could make a contribution because I knew we had real record problems coming because I'm a member of the Record Management Association, the independent consult- ants, and AIM, which is an imaging association. And I thought I could make a contribution, but they would not give me a chance.
The Chairman. It sounds like that's why they didn't want you.
[Laughter.]
Mr. RoMER. Absolutely.
The Chairman. It sounds like that was your disqualification, that you knew what you were talking about.
Mr. Romer. I did know.
Mr. Mangelsdorf. I didn't come to speak about computers, but I will add that when we started out, we had this little computer system and then we made this really big computer system. Re- cently, we decided that was too big and we cut it back. Every time we did that, we incurred extra expenses. Now it's kind of a me- dium-sized computer system. It did what the little system did, but it just does a little bit more of what it used to do. So I guess we couldn't really decide what we wanted the computer system to do before we ordered it up and just spent money until we figured out how it would work.
The Chairman. Go ahead, Ms. Crisman. Then we're going to let Mr. Mangelsdorf finish, then I want to get the other witnesses to speak.
Ms. Crisman. I would like to add just one comment with respect to contracts flowing to friends and acquaintances.
Most of the examples given here today were with respect to legal contracting. I just want to point out that the procedures for legal contracting are practically nonexistent. Whereas, there are very tight procedures for asset-type contracting. And I personally
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haven't found that those procedures allow for contracts to flow to friends and relatives. But I agree that there is a big problem with the legal procedures.
The Chairman. You wanted to say something. Then we're going to have Mr. Mangelsdorf finish.
Mr. KoszoLA. Thanks. I never met any of these witnesses before and some of them I haven't known for more than 24 hours. As far as legal contracts, I know personally that in Chicago alone the chief of the legal section was involved in one law firm that was awarded approximately $3 million in fees. And one contract that he was in the process of awarding to the law firm was a quarter of a million dollars. Just 2 to 3 days after that contract was awarded, he began employment negotiations with that firm. It was a com- mon practice to award all this money to a law firm where they ei- ther worked before working at the KTC or worked right after the contract was awarded.
The Chairman. Senator Metzenbaum, in particular, has really tried to track down these legal contracts and the fact that so many of them seem to be excessive on their face. There are a lot of ques- tions about the pattern of where these contracts went. But it seems to me that what he's just cited sort of fits right in.
Senator Metzenbaum. Absolutely. And, Mr. Chairman, I must tellyou that when Bill Seidman took over the chairmanship of the RTC, I thought they were bringing in a class act, a former account- ant, to run the RTC. I begged him, I pleaded with him, I knew Bill Seidman before he came to the RTC. He'd been an accountant. He owned some newspapers up in Michigan.
But I have to say to you that this is just such an abomination, such an abdication of responsibility. We have just thrown away hundreds of millions of dollars, billions of dollars, to law firms in this country, that we shouldn't have done so. This is confirming evidence, but the fact is that there's so much more and the law firms of this country have ripped off" the RTC and in most in- stances, it was the major law firms, not the little guys around the comer.
The accounting firms ought to be embarrassed for what they have done to the RTC. And these people again, this confirms it, but the worst part is I don't know what we can do about it. But I would like to suggest, Mr. Chairman, some of what has been said here today, and my guess is some more of what's going to be said, has to do with either violations of the law or that that borders on viola- tions of the law.
We are Members of Congress. We don't enforce laws. But I would like to stronglv surest something that you. and I were talking about previously an^that is that this entire record be printed up, that the entire statements be included, that you. Senator Kerry, and I meet either with Janet Reno or Phil He3anan, sit down and talk with them.
There have to have been some violations of law in the way the RTC was conducted. And I think going through this record it may not be too late to prosecute some of these people for ripping off the Taxpayers and the Federal Government. I would like to work with you in that connection. And I would like to work with Senator Kerry as well.
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I think this does call for law enforcement as well as just expo- sure here in this committee room.
The Chairman. Senator Kerry.
Senator Kerry. I was going to recommend that to you, Mr. Chairman, at the end of this hearing of all the testimony. I couldn't concur more with Senator Metzenbaum.
I don't think — I mean, it's clear from other testimony that we have from people who were too frightened to come forward who have also made some very strong statements. So what we are deal- ing with are not uncorroDorated statements here. We have 2- and 3- and 4-person corroboration. And as we all know, that's with staff that's extremely limited up here in its capacity to investigate.
But it is rather remarkable when you have a group of people coming from California, from Greorgia, from the central part of the country, I mean, this is all over the country. These are folks, each of whom I think witnessed, by their history, where they've come from, and how they came to the RTC, trying to make a contribution after years of service in the private sector, the public sector, or a combination of the two. There is a universality to the management practice, which contrary to somebody who summarized it in total as being a snake pit, I think it's a cesspool. It's incredible what's going on or not going on down there.
And I gather to date, how many of you are still working there? Raise your hands.
[Show of hands.]
Senator Kerry. Are these things still happening today?
Mr. Mangelsdorf. Yes, they are.
The Chairman. Let's get audible answers. We won't get the nod of the head.
Mr. KoszoLA. Yes.
Ms. LePique. Yes.
Voices. Yes.
[Laughter.]
Senator Kerry. So for everybody who is still working there, you sense this is continuing. Taxpayer dollars are still being wasted.
Mr. Henderson. Business as usual.
The Chairman. Are you nearly finished? Because I want to go ahead.
Mr. Mangelsdorf. I'm nearly done. Really, I am,
[Laughter.]
The Chairman. We have four more and I want to get them in and we are under some time pressure.
Senator Metzenbaum. Do you want to give us the specifics with respect to that sale at the asking price and that it was turned down? That was just an incredible situation. Make that available to the committee.
Mr. Mangelsdorf. Senator Metzenbaum, that's common prac- tice.
Senator Metzenbaum. To turn down offers at the asking price?
Mr. Mangelsdorf. Absolutely.
The Chairman. Where do the asking prices come from? Why are they setting the asking price at a certain level, then somebody shows up ready to buy it and then they back away? I think people find that
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Mr. Mange LSDORF. It's very uncommon for the RTC to swing at the first pitch.
The Chairman. Even if they've set the asking price and some- body walks in that's wilHng to pay it?
Mr. Mange LSDORF. The thou^t would be that if somebody is willing to pay the asking price, obviously the asking price is too low.
The Chairman. So let's ask a price that somebody is not willing to pay?
Mr. Mangelsdorf. You bet. Let me just go ahead and finish up here.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Mangelsdorf. Another avenue involves structured sales transactions. This is where the RTC evaluates property based on its income and not its market value. This leads to more discounting compared to the true value of the property. Because of the ex- tended escrow periods, straw buyers, and secrecy involved with these transactions, it takes more than a year to close.
Local communities feel that the RTC's continued discounting practices, with the option of structured sales, are depressing an al- ready fragile marketplace. Where I live, Los Angeles, it's started to look like a ghost town.
I don't think it's too late to reengineer this process and I do think that RTC stands ready to change. That's probably the rank and file for the panel here. I think, by the way, I can speak for the panel, we would like to join you all in a corrective process. I know that I would and I think everybody here would too.
Thank you for the opportunity to speak.
The Chairman. Mr. Bumside, we would like to hear from you now.
STATEMENT OF THOMAS BURNSmE, RESOLUTION TRUST CORPORATION, SENIOR ATTORNEY, RTC PLS PROGRAM [FORMER EMPLOYEE], DALLAS, TX
Mr. BURNSIDE. I was in RTC in Texas in the Professional Liabil- ity Program. I was in the Professional Liabihty Program before they had the big expansion. I was one of the original 17 attorneys. I was in Texas the entire time that the RTC was investigating Texas S&L's.
And, Senator Metzenbaum, you had read something from the presidential commission that said in general terms how bad things were in Texas as far as the S&L's. You have no idea how bad it was and how bad the looting was.
I was going through some numbers. Forty-one percent of all of the losses from S&L's were fi:-om Texas. Forty-one percent. I started calculating some numbers to see what that meant. Every man, woman, and child in the United States is going to have to pay $2,200 for Texas S&L's. That's not Texas banks, of which nine out of 10 failed. It's not the other 49 States. $2,200.
Well, I was there when we were trying to recover the money. My cases represented 73 percent of all the RTC professional liability recoveries in Texas, 73 percent. I went throue^ and looked at the published RTC figures on recoveries of the directors and officers
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cases that were brought in Texas. Of that $2,200, four cents of that was recovered from the directors and officers.
Of the attorneys in Texas who had papered all the deals for an entire decade, one penny of that was recovered. Of the securities brokers and the investment bankers in Texas who just looted it — I mean, if you've ever read Liar's Poker, on Wall Street they were making jokes about how easy it was to go and get Texas money. There was six cents from them. There was 21 cents from the ac- countants.
There was a lot of real estate problems in Texas. You've all read Inside Job. In that, there was one tenth of 1 percent that was re- covered from the appraisers.
All told, there was 36 cents recovered from the wrongdoers in Texas by the RTC. Now, the FDIC was down there too and they were working on it. But I worked side by side with some of those FDIC people. They didn't do a lot better.
If you go and look at those recoveries, there was almost no recov- ery. Why was that? There were a lot of reasons. But I would like to talk about three. The most egregious was it just wasn't inves- tigated down there.
The Chairman. Say that again.
Mr. BuRNsroE. It wasn't investigated down there. The RTC has been down in Texas for 4 years and they've got this recovery to show for it. Sure, they will probably get some more recoveries. Guys, the statute of limitations has expired. It expired for most of the thrifts a year ago. The story is over. Now we're looking at it.
But as far as investigations, Senator Kerry, I think you said you were a prosecutor. You know how important subpoenas are to go out and get information. You go into a billion dollar thrift, you got a bunch of dead records there. You're not going to understand that thrift until you get out and understand what happened, talk to the people, go out and find documents.
You know, the biggest thing you do when you are investigating is follow the money trail, figure out where the money went, then you build your case. The only way you can follow the money trail in Texas or anywhere else is to issue a subpoena.
If I want to go down the street to a bank and get some tracing records, they say, send me a subpoena, which is fine, that's what the law says. Well, let me tell you how little the subpoena power was used in Texas. In the Houston field office in Texas, which was handling I think about 37 or 40 thrifts, they issued three subpoe- nas out of the entire office. Three subpoenas. Do you think those institutions were investigated?
In Dallas where they had the largest bank fraud task force ever formed by the Department of Justice, that office issued 43 subpoe- nas. There was no investigation down there. And then when the limitation expired, people would write these memos saying there doesn't appear to be enough evidence to support a viable claim.
Let me ask you, if you sent out three subpoenas, what kind of evidence is there going to be? There was none.
In Houston, there were three subpoenas issued. I had one case in Houston where I issued 100 subpoenas on one case. I followed the money trail. When I went to the settlement table, I had the people on the other side, and whenever they would talk to me
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about a case, I would say, look, we've talked to those people, we know, we've got the money. We ended up settling the case.
Hundreds of subpoenas on one case, and three for the rest of the office. What the hell happened?
There's another case in Texas, and I will talk about this later, but it just shows you how important the subpoenas are. This was a pretty quiet thrift in Texas, no one had ever really heard of it. It was unique in that it wasn't even Federally insured until Decem- ber 1986, which meant the Taxpayers were not even on the hook for that institution. December 1986, it failed.
The Chairman. Could I stop you just for one minute?
The 41 percent was the figure you used of the total losses in the whole system that came from Texas. Virtually all of that came from State chartered thrifts in Texas as well. In other words
Mr. BURNSIDE. That's exactly right. I don't recall ever running into a Federally chartered thrift down there.
The Chairman. So there was this quirk in the law where the State could give an S&L a broader charter to do additional things than the Federal charter would allow. And, in fact, the vast num- ber of losses took place in those State chartered thrifts.
Nevertheless, it was all covered by Federal deposit insurance. That was one of the gaping holes in our regulatory system which we've since dealt with. But that's what really set the system up for these kinds of absolutely astronomical losses. But go ahead and then I want to pursue something with you here in a minute.
Mr. BURNSIDE. Senator, they not only gave them broad charters, they gave them a blank check.
But on this other thrift I was telling you about, on this thrift, I was an inside Government attorney. I probably spent a thousand hours working on this one case alone. It was a big case for me, it was really important to me. We issued subpoenas on that, we went out and talked to people.
Just a few weeks before the statute of limitations expired, we fi- nally got hold of the auditors workpapers of the holding company and, as much as we knew there were problems in this thrift, we were absolutely stunned to learn that two of the officers in the holding company were minority owners of the thrift, and had pulled out $18 million in compensation and stock benefits and that sort of thing in an 18-month period. If we hadn't issued the subpoe- nas, we wouldn't have known about that. We had to follow the money trail. Once we followed the money trail, the whole case came together.
Yet, I get back to the fact, how are you going to investigate these institutions unless you're following the money trail and getting out there and figuring out where the hell the money went.
The Chairman. Who was tanking these cases or this investiga- tive effort? It sounds to me, with so much money at stake, that it almost takes conscious decisions to not do the work as opposed to, you know, just people being asleep at the switch, especially when there are people like you working day and night to try to track this stuff down. What was going on here?
Mr. BURNSIDE. Senator, I was just a line attorney. I don't know what happened. Any time that people ask me the intent question, I truly don't know.
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One thing I can say is that I have been practicing law with the directors and officers in the professional liability area my entire ca- reer. That's what I have been doing for the last 11 years. The FDIC has always taken the position in those cases that people intend the natural and probable consequences of their act, and that's how peo- ple prove intent. You don't nave the smoking gun memo that says, let's tank the program. You go and look at the consequences and then you look at the foreseeability of that.
Senator Kerry. Did you ask for subpoenas?
Mr. BuRNSiDE. I was issuing subpoenas.
Senator Kerry. Were they being asked for in these other cases?
Mr. BURNSIDE. Not that I know of
Senator Kerry. Why not?
Mr. BURNSIDE. I have no idea.
Well, Senator, if I could, Senator Kerry, subpoenas were being asked for. The investigations unit down in Texas was begging their attorneys to issue subpoenas, absolutely begging people because they would be looking at records inside the thrift and they couldn't go outside and figure out what happened until they got the subpoe- nas.
They were told by one professional liability manager down there that he didn't want to send out subpoenas because, "it would send out the wrong message." He came to me. He was flabbergasted. And he said, Tom, what kind of message are we trying to send out by not sending subpoenas?
The Chairman. Let me ask you this. I understand you graduated from a top law school. What law school did you graduate from?
Mr. BURNSIDE. Washington University in St. Louis.
The Chairman. Am I right in understanding you were 18th in your class?
Mr. BURNSIDE. That's right.
The Chairman. So you bring very considerable legal skill, at least based on that placement.
Is it your sense that there were hot cases down there that were not pursued because either they were likely to lead to people that would be embarrassing or things of that kind? I'm not asking you to surmise what you don't have any basis to do so with some mean- ing. But it's so implausible that people who are hired to track down the losses and who are asking for the subpoenas are shut down and not allowed to do so. There has to be a reason. I'd like to know what the reason is. Was it because people were being protected? What was going on here? What's your best judgment?
Mr. BURNSIDE. Senator, I really don't know. I will say, and I was going to deal with this at the end of my statement, I was a pretty damn good professional liability attorney down in Texas and I worked real hard with the investigators, I worked real hard with my lawyers. And on the case that I was telling you about where we had found this $18 million, we went after those people pretty hard. I mean, we wanted to get some recoveries and in fact the re- coveries out of that case are second only to Lincoln Savings for the RTC.
One week before the statute of limitations was supposed to ex- pire, 1 week, and we had gone through several other agreements and we were going to go to court on it, I was told to fire two key
55
fee counsel on my case. I said, it's going to gut my case. I'm not going to do it.
Senator Kerry. Who told you that?
Mr. BURNSIDE. My managers in the legal division.
Senator Kerry. Was there a rationale? Did they offer you a ra- tionale? You must have said, why would they do that.
Mr. BuRNsroE. It was the most bizarre rationale I had ever seen. What had happened was two of the attorneys were working at a large Dallas law firm and were going to move over to a small His- panic law firm that was working on the case. Essentially what they were going to do was submit their bills to me under a different let- terhead. Rather than the big law firm, they were going to submit it to me imder the Hispanic letterhead and that firm was going to share in the profits of it. They were also going to reduce their fees because they were going to a smaller office that had lower over- head by about $30 an hour.
Well, they couldn't negotiate their rates with the RTC and they said, since we can't negotiate the rates, get rid of them and hire someone else.
What I did was, I said, I am not going to do this. I am going to go to the clients, because in the RTC the business side is the client, not the lawyers. I said, they are not going to put up with this.
I was given a written order that I was not supposed to discuss this with the client. I was flabbergasted. So I called Washington and I told them the problem and I said, I am not going to follow this order. It's illegal for someone to tell another lawyer not to com- municate to his client.
A few days later, I was given written instructions that I was not supposed to talk to the PLS management in Washington, DC, un- less there were two managers in Dallas that were present for each and every conversation. It was a circus. I had a case where the statute of limitations was expiring, it was a high profile case, it took me 5 days to discuss that case with Washington.
So I followed the internal grievance procedure. That became a joke. They assigned the person that was supposed to adjudicate the grievance who was a subordinate and close personal friend of the very person who was giving me the gag orders.
Finally I said, I've had enough of this. I called the General Ac- coimting Office and sent them everything I had.
By this time, the investigations unit in Dallas was absolutely livid about what was going on and they called the General Account- ing Office. Within less than 2 weeks of us calling them, they had three investigators down there. They were stunned at what they saw. They went over to the investigations unit.
Senator Kerry. Did you get the case filed?
Mr. BURNSIDE. Actually, we ended up settling it.
Senator Kerry. Before the statute of limitations?
Mr. BURNSIDE. Oh, no.
Senator Kerry. How many cases were lost by virtue of the stat- ute of limitations expiring?
Mr. BURNSIDE. Senator, if you go to the RTC and ask them, they will be able to show you a closeout memo on just about any case and they will say, well, we investigated it and, here, we have a
56
memo in our file that's dated before the Hmitation expired that says this case was closed, we didn't miss the statute.
But let me ask you this. If you have an office that's issuing three subpoenas and then they write a memo that says, we haven't found any evidence that warrants pursuing this, is that missing the stat- ute of limitations?
Senator Kerry. Let's come back for a minute. What was the per- centage of loss in Texas?
Mr. BuRNsroE. I think it's 41.19 percent.
Senator Kerry. How much is that in money?
Mr. Burnside. Well, I had a tough time finding that. I went to the Stanford
Senator Metzenbaum. $51 bilhon.
Senator Kerry. It's about $51 billion, correct?
Somewhere in that vicinity?
Mr. BuRNsroE. I would say if you include interest and everything else on that, it's way, way above that.
Senator Kerry. Of the $51 billion, what is the amount recov- ered?
Mr. Burnside. In Texas, we have recovered less than $10 million from the directors and officers. We have recovered $1.6 million from the attorneys. We have recovered $150,000 from the apprais- ers. We have recovered about $4-5 million from the securities bro- kers. And we've gotten about $66 million from the accountants. All told, in Texas, from RTC cases, there have been $90 million in re- coveries as of the last report from the investigations unit.
The Chairman, And two thirds of that from the accountants?
Mr. Burnside. That's exactly right.
Senator Kerry. Let me just addf you're saying that out of 43 sav- ings and loans that amounted to tne $50 billion of loss, only three subpoenas were issued?
Mr. Burnside. Senator, the cases were divided among offices. There were a lot more than 43 thrifts in Texas. That was 43 han- dled by that office.
Senator Kerry. Forty-three cases in that office. So, out of 43 cases in that office, only three subpoenas were issued?
Mr. Burnside. That's right.
Senator Kerry. Do you happen to know what the record is over- all?
Mr. Burnside. I believe that if you were to look at the records for Texas that there may have been about 325 subpoenas issued in Texas institutions, and about 240 of those were issued by me.
[Laughter.]
The Chairman. If I may say, what you are describing is the Gov- ernment, in effect, taking a dive here in terms of not aggressively going out and doing what it was charged by law to do. We wrote a law right here in this room to put people like you to work doing exactly what you're trying to do and we also provided a special grant of appropriations money to the Justice Department to hire the people to go out and literally track down these losses of the kind you are describing.
What it sounds like to me happened here was that somewhere along the line the inference is — I certainly draw the inference — that somewhere along the line the decision was made not to ag-
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gn*essively pursue these cases, not to do the logical things to do when you're out seeking financial recoveries.
Even in the case where you were hot on the trail of one and you put the subpoenas out and you built your case, then you ran into these roadblocks right at the very end that seemed to be impossible to understand in any logical sense other than the fact it looks like they were trying to sidetrack your effort or stall your effort and maybe run out the statute of limitations.
I want to know what was the name of that case?
Mr. BURNSIDE. Could I tell you in chambers, because I am not sure at this point that it would be appropriate for me to identify the case that specifically? I just don't know.
The Chairman. All right. Well do it that way and then we'll make a decision.
What I want to know is, I want to know who these officers and directors are and I want to know who the officers and directors are in the other cases where, in effect, nothing was done and where, in effect, the Government ended up taking a dive, letting the stat- ute of limitations run, getting these inconsequential recoveries when you look at them in the face of the scale of the losses.
You know, this has cropped up in here before a different way, be- cause there has been a lot of discussion about whether we should have extended the statute of limitations, especially on officers and members of the boards of directors, to go back and catch people who either were complicitous in this decisionmaking or were just derelict in their duty and were, in effect, there and not performing as they should have.
That's a very hot issue because a lot of those directors are high profile people. They are prominent people, they are politically ac- tive people. If you go out £ind throw the net out and you grab that crowd, you set off all kinds of shock waves, all kinds of repercus- sions. And we're talking here about one State. We're talking about Texas, which is a State with the lion's share of the total losses for the whole country.
And, I suspect, when you look at the names and faces and rela- tionships, you're talking about a veiy potent sort of cross section of individuals, a lot of political implications, particularly at that time and in that place. I mean, am I not describing accurately the situation?
Mr. BURNSIDE. I understand what you're saying.
The Chairman. That's why I think we need to know. The worst of all sins here would not just be the failing to perform and to go out and, in effect, the Grovemment taking a dive and not seeking these recoveries on a timely basis and letting the chance for recov- ery get away. But the worst of all worlds would be that all of this was parked in an unmarked grave so nobody ever knew or under- stood any of it. It was all just tossed over the side and we go on to new business.
It seems to me at a minimum, both for the sake of the losses that took place and also for people like vourself who did the best you could to try to go out and do your job and were thwarted, were ac- tively thwarted from doing your job, somebody ought to be held ac- countable at whatever level up and down the chain of command that kind of obstruction was coming from.
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If people walked away because they had special connections or because they were somehow in a favored position and the statute of limitations was allowed to run, I think we ought to get to know about it.
Senator Kerry. Let me add to that, Mr. Chairman, and I ap- plaud what you're saying. But you said that two of the officers were compensated for $18 million each?
Mr. BuRNSlDE. That's with stock options and everything else.
Senator Kerry. For the span of a year-and-a-half? This is in a savings and loan. This is not Disney Corporation or some major venture capital effort. This is a savings and loan.
Mr. Burnside. They ran it up through the holding company. That's correct.
Senator Kerry, Within a savings and loan for 18 months, $18 million for that period. For each of them?
Mr. Burnside. Combined.
Senator Kerry. This is what you uncovered, only by virtue of the subpoena, correct?
Mr. Burnside. We never would have known if we hadn't subpoe- naed it.
Senator Kerry. So for all those other banks, for all those $50 bil- lion of losses, we don't know how many other officers took $18, $20, $25 million or whatever it was over similar spans of time. Is that accurate?
Mr. Burnside. That's correct.
The Chairman. Excuse me. And they still have it?
Mr. Burnside. That's exactly right. These people had the money when we were going after them. They didn't have all of it, they didn't even have most of it, but they still had money.
Senator Kerry. And you described it earlier, I think accurately. This is not compensation. This is looting. Because who has turned around £Uid made up for that "compensation" that they looted over the span of 18 months but the average Taxpayer of this country, who had to bail out the people who lost the money that they looted, correct?
Mr. Burnside. Exactly right.
Senator Kerry. Here you are. How many years had you been practicing at that point in time?
Mr. Burnside. Eleven years.
Senator Kerry. So 11 years, you're a young, aggressive attorney, who saw this as an opportunity to really practice your profession, correct?
Mr. Burnside. That's correct.
Senator Kerry. You come in and the system thwarts you.
Mr. Burnside. That's right.
Senator, if I may, I'd like to complete my story.
We went to the GAO, the investigations unit who had been watching this thing going on and had been pleading for subpoenas, all came forward as a unit. One by one they went through and said, look at what happened in this case. The next day they came over to the legal division. I had prepared a memo which I have sub- mitted in there that said, this is what happened with the Texas cases. I then went back to St. Louis for the weekend to firm up coming back to my old law firm.
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The Monday when I got back into the office, my superiors who were the subject of my criticisms came in and said, we understand you're thinking about resigning. I said, that's right. They said, well, when do you think you'll leave? I said, I've got 20 institutions with billions of assets. Ill work with you on a leaving date so well have a transition. They said, that's not necessary. We want you out now.
My computer was shut off while I was in the office, I was locked out. The investigations unit was livid. They sent over five inves- tigators with boxes. They were going to move all of my files over to the investigations unit so I could continue working on the cases. We ended up not doing that. But I did go over to the investigations unit and finished out my Grovemment career, locked out of my of- fice, over in another building. I finally left.
I had 73 percent of all the recoveries in Texas and I was locked out of my building when I reported my superiors and said, why are they making me fire my counsel.
Senator Kerry. Who locked you out?
Mr. BURNSIDE. Arturo Vero-Rojas was the general counsel and he had three levels of subordinates under him that were all part of the decision.
The Chairman. It should be noted for the record that in 1991, 2 years ago, you received an award from the FDIC for sustained superior performance. Is that correct?
Mr. BuRNsroE. That's correct.
The Chairman. I think what you're telling us is that there's a huge story here. The question is, is there any way to go back and get it now? I mean, dig out what happened, who took the dive, why, who was protected? You know, who was allowed, in effect, to make off with the money?
You'd have to look at all the holding companies, wouldn't you, in effect to figure out the answer to Senator Kerry's question, who ac- tually grabbed these large amounts of money and ran?
Mr. BURNSIDE. Follow the money trail wherever the trail takes you.
The Chairman. But it sounds to me from your experience that you went down to do that and the people that you were working for really didn't want you to do that.
Mr. BURNSIDE. Some of them did, others didn't. I don't know what happened.
I will say this, if you want to find out what happened, go down to the line investigators, the poor people that were sitting in there with the documents trying to put together the case. Those people worked like hell trying to put together those cases and were frus- trated. And when I was locked out they came, to a person, to my support and they are being brutally punished now for that. But if you want to figure out what happened in Texas, go down and talk to those people and they will take you case by case, memo by memo on each case of what was happening.
Senator Kerry. I think you hit the nail on the head. I mean, I can tell you and I think I have had this conversation a little bit with some folks here previously in discussing this issue. But, you know, there is a difference between a legitimate investigation and a lot of what we see in this process. We saw that in BCCI, we saw it in a lot of narcotics efforts 5 or 6 years ago. You know, there is
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just a distinction between saying we're looking at something in a legitimate aggressive effort that issues subpoenas, calls people in, and sends out a message of its intent to get to the bottom of some- thing.
I mean, I have seen it. I have presented evidence to a grand jury and I know the difference of what you can do if you're plotting carefully and thinking carefully with a strategy of where you sub- mit a subpoena when and how you're going about building that trail that you've talked about. That just has never happened in this. It hasn't happened.
Billions and billions of dollars, an extraordinarily obvious politi- cal interconnecting network. And somehow, somewhere, this thing got shut down. I think, you know, I'm not one of those who leaps to theories around here, but I think it's one of the great untold as yet, un-fully discovered, and unwritten about coverups and there was a lot of very careful obfuscation that targeted other folks and did a lot of other things to kind of cloud the trail during a period of time here.
But, you know, when somebody of your capabilities is telling us a story that you are handling 73 percent of this stuff and you've got three subpoenas out in X number of cases, I am frankly mind boggled when I think about what the repercussions of that are to the taxpaying citizens of this country, not to mention just the sys- tem.
You know, all of you are just living testimony to the lack of credi- bility in the system today.
The CHAraMAN. And more than that, it goes back to this question of how much of this is just sheer incompetence and how much of it is deliberate tanking of serious effort, because that is obstruction of justice. Laws were written to empower you to do exactly what you were trying to do. We appropriated money to provide for the kind of legal talent that you represent to go out and do exactly what you were doing, and that's to follow these money trails, track down these cases and get the financial recoveries.
So to the extent that that was thwarted, it was thwarted con- sciously and actively by anybody up and down the chain of com- mand, that clearly obstructs the process of justice that we had set in motion. That's not — that can't be excused by just sheer incom- petence or stupidity. You're describing a pattern that, to me, has to be a conscious pattern, not just a random accidental pattern.
Mr. BURNSIDE. Senator, to the extent that you're following that trail, I was just a line attorney, so I don't know what was happen- ing at the higher levels, but if you take a look at that reorganiza- tion that happened in 1992 and you look at what that did to Texas and a number of turnovers that you had on cases
Senator Kerry. Let me interrupt you there. It's my understand- ing that they're shutting down the PLS now with a second reorga- nization. And even as we're sitting here there is a process that is going to diminish even what is left. Is that accurate?
Mr. BURNSIDE. That's exactly right.
Senator Kerry. So even as we sit here there's another sort of process going on that is going to diminish the ability to get the re- patriation of money back. Is that right?
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Mr. BURNSIDE. That's correct. Senator, to my count, there have been five reorganizations, some major and some minor, on the at- torneys handhng the S&L cases in Texas. Five reorganizations. What kind of continuity do you have on those cases?
Senator Metzenbaum. Mr. Bumside, isn't it a fact that the man who hired you, Arturo Vero-Rojas, is he the man that fired you?
Mr. BURNSIDE. He didn't fire me. They just locked me out. I was going to resign anyway.
Senator Metzenbaum. But he's the one that failed to give you co- operation so you could go forward?
Mr. BuRNsroE. That's right.
Senator Metzenbaum. Where is he now?
Mr. BURNSIDE. It's my understanding that he's been detailed to Washington. I don't know what he's doing here. My immediate su- perior in Dallas was subsequently transferred to Washington and I understand the RTC places a $55,000 cost for each and every transfer. They're transferring the people out of there. I don't know why, but they are transferring people out of there.
Senator Metzenbaum. They're bringing them here to Washing- ton?
Mr. Burnside. And bringing them to Washington.
Mr. Mangelsdorf. Good luck, Mr. Metzenbaum.
Senator Metzenbaum. Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Let me just say this to you, Howard, and to John and all of you, because we happen to care very much about what we're talking about here and we've got a nominee pending for the RTC. I don't intend to confirm anybody, I don't care who it is, until we have a plan here that's going to put a stop to this kind of thing, period, once and for all, and I want the attorney general to be part of it, as we have discussed, and every other official of the Govern- ment needs to be part of it. We are not going to just roll along with this kind of a situation out there and good people trying to do their jobs being harassed, thwarted, locked out, blocked. And nobody ever able to quite figure out where the signals are coming from to put in the fix. But we have to figure out a way to change that.
Senator Metzenbaum. We wHl work together to get the Depart- ment of Justice into this matter. But I want to say to the chairman something I commented on earlier.
The present administration is not doing all that they could do or should do with respect to these issues. As a matter of fact, the present administration has opposed the extension of the statute of limitations in the matter of making it retroactive. I do not give them any credit for that. It is my considered opinion that the Presi- dent does not have the slightest idea what's going on.
But there are people in positions of high authority who have ac- tually opposed the effort to extend the statute. And when I have gone to the floor on that issue in the past, both you and Senator Kerry have been very supportive. But the administration has not been.
We have a difference of opinion with the House because the House didn't accept it, and how could we expect them to when the administration was not doing its job.
So I say that, although I support the President, he doesn't know that this is going on. The Vice President doesn't know. But those
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who do know, and I will be pleased to tell you who they are pri- vately, they know and they haven't been on the side of the Tax- payers. They have been on the side of protecting the officers and directors who have ripped off the system.
The Chairman. Mr. Bumside, have you finished or do you have more?
Mr. BuRNSroE. I have a few more remarks. I will just briefly con- clude.
The failure to investigate is obviously the biggest problem. The second problem was the reorganizations. You Ibiow, when you're putting together groups of people to go in and investigate billion dollar thrifts, you just can't simply pass the file on, no matter how good the people are.
The Chairman. Might this not have been deliberate? We had hearings in here before. We've talked with some of the other people who are witnesses here today and the clear appearance to me, at least, was that some of these reorganizations were actually a kind of a cover to get people like you off these key cases at key times.
In other words, we've heard that from other people who were out there trying to do these kinds of things, who feel as if their job as- signments were being shuffled at a particular time, essentially to thwart them from getting their job done, and it was being done in the name of reorganization, which gave it kind of a surface legit- imacy. But it was basically to yank people off cases because they were about to nail somebody.
Mr. BURNSIDE. I can't disagree. There was certainly a vendetta in the RTC to get rid of professional liability attorneys.
The Chairman. You finish any other remarks you want to make and then I want togo to our next witnesses here.
Mr. BURNSIDE. The last thing that I would say is, I was locked out. I am gone. I am going back to practice with my old law firm, so this is over for me.
But there are good people down there in Dallas who have stood by me and have come forward and have cooperated with everybody that's come down there. They have cooperated with the GAO, they did everj^hing they were supposed to internally. They cooperated with your staffs, and they are being brutally punished down there for standing up and saying this is wrong.
To give you an example, and this is so absurd, there were three managers in the investigations unit down there who showed up as a group and supported me. After this whole thing was over, they sent in the people from Kansas City to supervise these people and now they've got nine management positions down there.
To go from three managers to nine managers and they're cutting back staff You think those people aren't being punished? Talk about reinventing Government, you know, downsizing your staff and tripling your management, that makes no sense.
The Chairman. I think we'll call those three up here and give them a chance to get out and tell their story in the light of day.
Mr. BURNSIDE. They'd be wonderful witnesses.
The Chairman. I suspect they will.
I want to be able to juxtapose what they say to the managers who have been making your life miserable. I want to yank them out into the light of day too.
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Mr. BURNSIDE. The last thing I would like to do is just conclude with this comment. After I went back to St. Louis, I received a package at my law firm. I opened it up and inside was a simple portrait. It had a simple black fi'ame, a white background, and let- ters saying "he who is silent is understood to consent." And I got that from the Dallas management of the investigations unit. I did not consent. The people down in the investigations unit did not consent.
The Chairman. I also want to use this moment through you, to you and your colleagues and anybody else out there in the ranks, that we want all the information that anybody has. I want people coming forward. I want them to come forward anonymously, if they are more comfortable with that, to give us what facts and informa- tion they have. I want those who are willing to come forward open- ly with whatever they have.
But I want to make this an open request and invitation to every person out in the RTC that has other factual information of this kind that would fit these patterns with times, names, places, cir- cumstances to get that information to us. That's what I am asking for. This is a blanket request out through you to all your colleagues out there so we can assemble as much of this information as we possibly can.
Mr. ROMER. I would like to add iust one comment to him, since I have dealt considerably with the legal department that he's talk- ing about.
The general policy was, if you had a simple one-page contract, you take it down to legal and they'd assign it to an outside firm and in a few weeks or days it would come back and they'd OK it and they'd bring it back to you. But one that I'd like to point out significantly, when I was refusing to give a contract to a vice presi- dent of a savings and loan and they called me in and they said, you can go ahead, and I said, over my dead body I'll give them a contract because they're illegal.
I was called over to an outside law firm to discuss, you know, why I was doing this. And I said, well, I was in charge of the reg- istration. It says in 1606 you've got to list any savings and loan that you were in in the last 5 years, you've got to write it down and give the list. And I said, that's what they didn't do. In the verbal and the whole thing, they covered it all the way.
Chicago was forward enough to turn them down, but Dallas wasn't. They had too many friends down there.
But, she says, that's not right because, yes, it does say you have to list, you know, the 5 years. They're listed on the front of the pro-
f-am because they own the program. So they're listed over here, ut it doesn't say anything about savings and loans. She said, no, it doesn't say that. It says you have to have them on a list some- where.
I just threw up my hands and went away. That was not the in- tent. The intent of the law was to list if you've been in a savings and loan for 5 years, not just listed on a back page with a list of people, of employees, that doesn't cover it. That is not the intent of the 1606 written by Congress, but that's the way it was inter- preted by outside law firms. And most of our attorneys assigned the work outside and served as clerks.
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The Chairman. We must in the interest of time go forward now. Mr. Pederson, you've been here before. You were a very important and helpful witness the last time. We told you we were going to follow up on this. We hope today's hearing is evidence of the fact that we meant what we said.
Then we want to hear from Ms. Taylor, who has also testified here before and we have been grateful for that.
And, finally, Mr. John Waechter will be our last witness.
Go ahead, Mr. Pederson.
TESTIMONY OF BRUCE J. PEDERSON, RESOLUTION TRUST CORPORATION, ATTORNEY, FORMERLY IN RTC PLS PRO- GRAM, DENVER, CO
Mr. Pederson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I wish we could meet under more pleasant circumstances than we've had the last 2 years.
I do want to thank you and the committee for your continued in- terest. I think it has been considerable and significant. It has played a major role in my ability to stay on the RTC payroll.
I also want to express my gratitude to Senator Metzenbaum for being here today, as well as to Congresswoman Schroeder, both of whom also have taken an active interest in the issues and people involved.
They tell me today is the first day of fall. I want to tell you that I come from a slightly different season of the year. I come from a very long, cold, and dark winter, a winter of retaliation at the RTC. For the last 12 to 15 months, my life has been a living hell at this agency. They have done everything they could to drive me out of the agency or to trump up charges that would enable them to dis- cipline me and hopefully fire me.
I come today with two messages. Message one is that there is rampant retaliation at this agency. This panel has heard eloquent testimony for that proposition. Those who think on their own at the RTC are suspect. Those who question authority are punished. And, Grod forbid, those who dissent are crushed.
I know from my personal experience, having ridden my bicycle up to the Tienamin Square at RTC that management's tanks roll freely and with wild abandon. It is a sick and dysfunctional cor- porate culture which stifles dissent and employee efforts to improve the system.
Message two is, we need accoimtability. I think Senator Sasser had a most appropriate term earlier this morning. We need "zero tolerance" for the kind of abysmal conduct which management en- gages in to punish people who, as loyal public servants, are trying to improve the system.
If this agency can't be reinvented with more accountability then, I submit, it ought to be killed. Take its vital programs and give them over to a more responsible agency, which has the mature management team in place to handle these programs in the best interests of the Taxpayer.
By way of brief background, I think it is already well known that I was here last year on August 11, 1992, together with Ms. Taylor and Mr. Bradley Smolkin testifying before this committee in open session that the RTC's reorganization in 1992 gutted the Profes-
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sional Liability Program. We later followed up with a detailed 53- page rebuttal statement in November 1992, rebutting each and every one of the RTC's flimsy excuses and rationales for what went down.
We also note with some degree of bittersweet satisfaction that, since those events, two independent authorities have come in and substantially vindicated our testimony from last year. The GAO submitted a report earlier this summer and the RTC Inspector General, regardless of its problems, couldn't ignore the evidence that the program was substantially compromised and that future claims were placed at risk with the arbitrary and ill-advised reor- ganization of PLS that went down in 1992.
We told you what was coming, but I think the most eloquent tes- timony this committee could receive has just come from Mr. Burnside. He didn't tell you what was coming. He told you what came. And now you know how the RTC operates and how they tell this committee one thing and proceed to do another. They can tell you they haven't missed a deadline, but now you know why they can make that flimsy and feeble statement. They don't bother to in- vestigate the claims.
Senator Kerry, you're right on. There is an untold story here and we continue to make what efforts we can with our meager re- sources to fill in those gaps. There's a lot that ought to be found out about an organized lobby out there that's doing everything in its power to put sticks in the wheels of the FDIC and the RTC's Professional Liability Sections in their efforts to recover money for Taxpayers.
Senator Metzenbaum has referred to a trend in the State legisla- tures to pass statutes which are going to water down the standards of liability. That's yet one more piece in the mosaic which has formed over the last year which allows us to continue making the argument and raising this issue.
Someone earlier this morning made the comment, "judge people's intent by the results of their actions." I think that's damn good ad- vice for the RTC. Look at what the results have produced, and I think that will tell you a lot about their original intentions.
I also add by way of footnote that I have had the honor to serve as Mr. Bumside's grievance representative while he was still em- ployed at the RTC. Notwithstanding the shabby treatment which Ms. Taylor and I have received, I was still shocked by the disgust- ing conduct which he received from management in Dallas in lock- ing him out, effectively forcing him out of the agency a mere few days after he had openly cooperated with a GAO investigation, an obligation which I think any public servant has.
With respect to the detailed messages I have, number one, retal- iation is rampant. Ms. Taylor is going to provide you with a de- tailed list of all the examples we have endured, and I won't belabor them right now. I simply want to remind you that when you hear that list, in the back of your mind, remember that every time man- agernent retaliates against an RTC employee Taxpayer dollars are funding their unacceptable behavior.
I do want to speak very briefly on one type of retaliation, though, which this committee, as a matter of public policy, ought to more closely scrutinize. In addition to the laundry list of reprisals we
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have endured, this committee is also aware of the break-in of my computer at the RTC. It seems like management wanted Watergate returned back to the headlines. They effectively, without my con- sent, without a court order, without a search warrant, got access to my WordPerfect files, files which contained work product and thought process, if you will, and correspondence which I had writ- ten between myself and Ms. Taylor and a variety of oversight enti- ties. They included the RTC Office of Inspector General and a law enforcement agency. They included this very committee and its staffers. They included the General Accounting Office, and they in- cluded Congresswoman Schroeder's office.
All of those work products concerned public policy issues, whis- tleblowing efforts on our part, and a general attempt to improve the operation of the RTC.
Management at the RTC saw fit to have free license to just wade in and help themselves. I was always intrigued, whatever the trumped up reason was that they have given this committee and others for doing what they did, why they never came to me and simply asked me, "could we please have a copy of the XYZ file in your WordPerfect which we think has to do with a particular sub- ject." That would have been too decent gmd up front.
Instead, they had to do it in, I guess, the middle of the night or after hours, behind my back. It raises issues of criminal violations of wire tap statutes that are designed to govern unauthorized ac- cess to computers. It raises profound constitutional issues and rights to privacy which may have been violated in this case.
One of the exhibits to the joint statement which Ms. Taylor and I have provided the committee today consists of a detailed memo- randum I composed last spring detailing many of these legal is- sues. And finally there are the public policy issues.
What does this say about Government acting as a "Big Brother" with respect to all Federal employees? Are we going to allow mana- gerial prerogative, whatever that might be, to be stretched to allow any manager to retaliate against a given employee with this tool? I think not. And what does it say about law enforcement agencies and their abilities to work with cooperative witnesses?
My products for the IG were stolen by management, the very tar- gets of my concern. This committee and others on the Hill have had their relationship with me interfered with by the actions of RTC management.
I hold in my hsuid a memo which I wrote to Congresswoman Schroeder's office on March 12, 1993. To the best Ms. Taylor and I can determine, that's the exact day when my computer was bro- ken into by RTC management. I don't know whether they got a copy of this document or not.
The point is, they were traipsing through some pretty sensitive stuff which I don't think they had a right to look at. I think if this conduct is either sanctioned or unquestioned, it can only encourage a grotesque chilling effect on all public employees.
Message two: Accountability.
The system is broken and the fact that everything you're about to hear from Ms. Taylor could go down is quite persuasive with re- spect to showing what's wrong right now.
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First of all, you've got dysfunctional management. I hope this committee, in confirming wnomever becomes uie next CEO of the RTC, will pay close attention to the culture of deception which lower ranked managers freely engage in at present at the RTC. They are spin control artists in the truest sense of the word. I hope that vou will not be deluded by their efforts to backfill, their efforts to tell you that here are all the facts and at the same time they will be leaving out certain key elements. Take a very jaundiced view to what they tell you based on today's testimony. I think you know why.
The grievance system at the RTC is horribly broken. Mr. Burnside provided you with an elegant example. We, too, have gone through that system to no avail. It needs to be junked. It either needs to be replaced with an ombudsman, an administrative law judge, or